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EDITORIAL
It is with great pleasure that I continue the 
tradition established by my predecessor 
Pedro Solbes of drawing together the main 
lines of the analysis presented in the regular 
Quarterly Reports on the Euro Area. 
It has now been about a year since the euro-
area economy began to turn around and, 
after a hesitant start, the recovery is now 
proceeding on increasingly firm ground. 
After running at about 1.5% during the 
second half of 2003, GDP growth gathered 
momentum in the first quarter of this year 
with an annualised rate of 2.3%. This was 
above both consensus expectations and the 
Commission Spring 2004 Forecasts. After 
sending somewhat mixed signals in the first 
months of the year, confidence and leading 
indicators have now taken a more upbeat 
tone on the back of strengthening business 
sentiment. This shows that some of the 
uncertainties that had hitherto weighed on 
confidence have been lifted. Overall, recent 
data suggest that our spring forecast of 
1.7% GDP growth for 2004 – considered 
optimistic by some commentators at the 
time – now appears to have been somewhat 
on the low side.  
However, some uncertainty still surrounds 
the outlook for next year. The recovery is 
not yet self-sustaining and, in the context of 
a maturing global trade cycle, robust 
domestic demand will become increasingly 
necessary. Recent developments on this 
front have been somewhat mixed. The 
upswing in private consumption during the 
first few months of 2004, while marking a 
welcome break with the previous period of 
stagnation, still looks somewhat fragile. On 
the investment side, preliminary first quarter 
estimates were somewhat disappointing, but 
they are likely to be revised upwards. All in 
all, the investment recovery seems to be 
pursuing its course underpinned by 
strengthening business confidence, low 
capital costs and improving profitability. 
The recent increase in oil prices, meanwhile, 
is a cause for concern. However, the report 
suggests that higher oil prices should not be 
a major constraint on the euro-area 
recovery, for a number of reasons. First, the 
oil price increase at this stage is still 
relatively small in historical terms, and the 
economy’s dependence on oil has 
significantly decreased. Second, an analysis 
of developments in the oil market indicates 
that the recent rise should be, at least to 
some extent, temporary. Finally, the 
experience of the 1999-2000 oil shock 
suggests that the euro-area economy can 
now absorb higher oil prices more 
effectively than in the past.  
Nevertheless, a number of downside risks 
should be borne in mind. A further increase 
in oil prices, especially if it is more 
permanent, could inflict more serious 
damage on the euro-area economy. 
Furthermore, this oil price shock has hit the 
euro-area economy at an early stage of the 
recovery. While this should help ensure that 
wage claims remain moderate, it could also 
make business and consumer confidence 
more vulnerable to oil prices. 
Moving on from the overall assessment of 
the economic situation, the report, as is 
customary at this time of the year, contains 
a focus section dedicated to the mid-year 
review of fiscal policies in the euro area. It 
looks at whether Member States’ budgets 
for the current year are being implemented 
as planned and analyses possible reasons for 
divergence. Falling as it does in the midst of 
the budgetary preparations in most Member 
States, it also takes an early look at 
budgetary plans and developments in 2005. 
Member States’ 2003 stability programme 
updates suggest an improvement in the 
nominal budget deficit for the euro area by 
about ½% of GDP in both 2004 and 2005. 
However, more recent indications paint a 
less sanguine picture about the budgetary 
adjustment that is in the pipeline. 
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According to the Commission’s Spring 
Economic Forecasts, budgetary prospects 
for 2004 and 2005 are not especially 
promising. Following three years of fiscal 
slippages, both the actual and cyclically-
adjusted budget balances of the euro area 
are projected to be broadly unchanged in 
2004 and, if current policies are note 
changed, in 2005. Under that assumption, 
six Member States would post deficits above 
the 3% reference value in 2004 and/or 
2005. Moreover, the updates of the stability 
programmes show that a close-to-balance 
position in cyclically-adjusted terms will not 
be reached in several countries by 2007.  
Member States with excessive deficits would 
therefore be well advised to fully implement 
the measures they have committed to, in 
order to correct their excessive deficits by 
2005. In some other Member States, 
additional efforts will be necessary in order 
to prevent deficits rising above 3% of GDP. 
More generally, Member States that do not 
yet have a budgetary position ‘close to 
balance or in surplus’, need to step up 
consolidation efforts to achieve the annual 
improvement in their cyclically-adjusted 
budget positions of at least 0.5% of GDP, 
as agreed upon in the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines which were confirmed by 
the European Council in June. This is 
particularly urgent since the window of 
opportunity before the impact of ageing is 
fully felt is small and closing. The nascent 
recovery provides an ideal opportunity to 
step up fiscal consolidation.  
On this point, I would draw your attention 
to the historic agreement on the 
Constitution achieved at the June Brussels 
European Council and in particular to the 
annexed Declaration on the Stability and 
Growth Pact. It states that “Member States 
should use periods of economic recovery 
actively to consolidate public finances and 
improve their budgetary positions. The 
objective is to have a budgetary surplus in 
good times which creates the necessary 
room to accommodate economic 
downturns and thus contribute to the long-
term sustainability of public finances.” 
The final section of the report focuses on 
business cycle convergence in the euro area. 
Prior to the launch of EMU, many 
commentators saw the possibility of 
insufficient cyclical synchronisation between 
euro-area Member States as a major source 
of concern on the grounds that it could 
hamper the conduct of monetary policy. 
The report shows that these fears were 
exaggerated. The euro area is already 
characterised by a high degree of cyclical 
convergence among its Member States and 
this will be deepened in the coming years. 
EMU is indeed turning out to be a major 
driver of trade and financial integration 
between Member States and stronger trade 
and financial links are known to enhance 
cyclical synchronisation.  
EMU is not immune to forces of cyclical 
divergence, however. Divergence may arise 
because of country-specific shocks or 
differences in the transmission of common 
shocks. To ensure that EMU functions 
smoothly, it is important to strengthen the 
adjustment mechanisms that tend to 
counteract forces of cyclical divergence, 
including changes in external 
competitiveness and automatic fiscal 
stabilizers. Adjustment based on 
competitiveness has been at play since the 
launch of the single currency. However, 
because EMU is still characterised by 
significant price and wage rigidities, this 
adjustment mechanism is slow and can lead 
to costly periods of over- or undershooting. 
Further progress on structural reforms must 
therefore be made to enhance markets’ 
capacity to cope with shocks. Budgetary 
consolidation must also be pursued in order 
to allow the full play of automatic stabilisers. 
 
Joaquín ALMUNIA 
MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 
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I. Economic situation in the euro area 
Recent data indicate that the euro-area recovery is now proceeding on firm ground. GDP growth came in somewhat stronger 
than expected in the first quarter thanks to a pick-up in private consumption and a sharp rebound of exports. After 
sending somewhat mixed signals in the first months of the year, survey indicators are again pointing upwards on the back of 
a revival in business confidence. The external sector also continues to be supportive; however, the recovery of domestic demand 
remains hesitant. After several quarters of stagnation, private consumption picked up speed during the first months of 
2004, through this still appears fragile, with household confidence subdued and the labour market relatively weak. First 
estimates of investment growth in Q1 were disappointing but are likely to be revised upwards, and the recovery in investment 
seems to be continuing. The recent increase in oil prices poses a downside risk to the short-term growth outlook, but is small 
relative to the oil shocks of the 1970s or 1999-2000. Simulations suggest that its toll on growth will be limited in the euro 
area as a whole provided that it is only temporary, that wages and labour markets respond adequately and that growth in 
world trade is not overly affected. Nevertheless, the impact could be more significant in some Member States than in others, 
reflecting differences in energy intensity, the level of indirect taxation and the response of labour markets,. 
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects1 
GDP growth picked up in the first quarter  
National account data for the first quarter of 
2004 indicate that economic activity is 
progressively gaining momentum in the euro 
area. Quarter-on-quarter GDP growth picked up 
from 0.4% (revised upwards from 0.3%) in the 
last quarter of 2003 to 0.6% in the first quarter of 
                                                     
1 The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 30 June 2004.  
2004. The performance was slightly above 
consensus expectations but remained in the 
forecast range of 0.3-0.7% presented in the 
March Quarterly Report on the Euro Area. The 
acceleration of activity was attributable to a pick-
up in private consumption, which expanded 
faster than at any time since the beginning of 
2001, and a rebound in export growth. The 
inventory build-up, initiated in the last months 
of last year, continued in the first quarter of 2004, 
although at a slightly more moderate pace.  
Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
Forecast (1) 
 2003 Q2 
2003 
Q3 
2003 
Q4 
2004 
Q1 
Carryover 
to 2004 2004 (2) 2005 (2) 
 % change on previous period, volumes 
GDP -0.1 0.4 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.7 2.3 
Private consumption -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.7 1.6 2.3 
Government consumption 0.6 0.7 0.4 -0.2 0.6 1.2 1.3 
Gross fixed capital formation -0.3 0.1 0.6 -0.1 0.3 2.4 3.6 
Changes in inventories (% of GDP) 0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Exports of goods and services -0.9 2.3 0.2 1.7 2.7 4.9 5.9 
Imports of goods and services -0.5 1.3 1.1 0.8 2.1 5.0 6.6 
 % contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.1 1.6 
Government consumption 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Gross fixed capital formation -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.7 
Changes in inventories 0.0 -0.2 0.5 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 
Net exports -0.1 0.4 -0.4 0.4 0.3 0.0 -0.1 
(1) Annual change in %.         (2) European Commission Spring 2004 Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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By contrast, the performance of investment was 
disappointing. After early signs of recovery at the 
end of last year, gross fixed capital formation 
contracted mildly again in Q1. Government 
consumption fell during the quarter for the first 
time since 1997, which is suggestive of a tighter 
control of government spending in some 
Member States.  
The strengthening of growth in the first quarter 
was relatively broad-based across sectors, at least 
according to the 6-sector breakdown of GDP 
provided in quarterly accounts. Industry staged a 
strong performance with quarter-on-quarter 
growth accelerating from 0.5 to 1.1%. Activity 
also picked up in the service sectors, although 
more moderately and only for market-based 
services. In line with developments in 
government consumption, growth in non-market 
services decelerated sharply. The construction 
sector registered a marked contraction, suggesting 
that the weak performance of capital formation is 
rooted in developments in construction rather 
than equipment investment.2  
Finally, it is noteworthy that the acceleration of 
growth was also broad-based geographically. Of 
the six Member States for which Q1 GDP 
estimates were available at the time of the 
publication of the euro-area GDP estimate, only 
two (the Netherlands and Spain) reported a mild 
deceleration of growth. Activity strengthened in 
                                                     
2  Value added in the construction sector and construction 
investment tend to move in close tandem in the euro area.  
the three largest countries (Germany, France and 
Italy) as well as in Finland.  
The hard data so far available for the second 
quarter of the year is still limited but the latest 
releases of industrial production, manufacturing 
new orders and retail sales were encouraging. 
Year-on-year growth in industrial output 
accelerated to 1.7-1.8% in March and April. 
Manufacturing new orders have shown strong 
momentum in the past few months with year-on-
years growth at 6% in April. Finally, retail sales 
rose in April, pushing annual growth upwards to 
0.9%, the best performance in 12 months.  
Leading indicators point again upwards  
After sending somewhat mixed signals in the first 
months of the year, survey indicators are again 
pointing upwards on the back of strengthening 
confidence in the business sector.  
In the manufacturing sector, Reuters PMI 
increased significantly between February and 
May. After several months of fluctuations around 
its long-term average, ECFIN’s Business Climate 
Index rose markedly in April – posting its largest 
monthly gain since 1985 – and increased further 
in June. The BCI is now at its highest level in 
more than three years.  
To a lesser degree, recent developments have also 
been more upbeat in other sectors. Although it 
remained below the levels reached at the end of 
2003 and early this year, Reuters service index 
Table 2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2003-2004 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI4) Reuters Ser5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 101.0 0.0 2.9 52.2 54.4 95.6 -13.0 34.4 
Trough in latest 
downturn 87.7 -1.28 -3.6 42.9 46.7 87.3 -26.5 -10.4 
August 2003 94.3 -0.47 3.9 49.1 52.0 96.2 -14.3 52.5 
September 2003 96.2 -0.45 5.5 50.1 53.6 97.9 -14.5 60.9 
October 2003 97.0 -0.20 6.6 51.3 56.0 99.7 -10.6 60.3 
November 2003 98.9 0.07 6.9 52.2 57.5 100.9 -8.8 67.2 
December 2003 97.4 0.00 6.7 52.4 56.6 102.4 -6.9 73.4 
January 2004 98.5 0.16 6.5 52.5 57.3 102.8 -5.6 72.9 
February 2004 98.9 0.02 6.3 52.5 56.2 100.3 -6.8 69.9 
March 2004 98.9 -0.05 6.3 53.3 54.4 98.8 -4.1 57.6 
April 2004 100.2 0.39 5.8 54.0 54.5 97.7 -0.5 49.7 
May 2004 100.3 0.28  54.7 55.8 97.8 -2.5 46.4 
June 2004        47.4 
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator, six 
monthly change. 4) Reuters Purchasing managers index, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Services purchasing manager index. 6) Business 
expectations, West Germany. 7)  National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) Business expectations of financial market 
analysts, Germany. 
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surprised on the upside in May. The picture is 
more mixed for ECFIN’s service indicator, which 
increased in May after six months of stagnation 
but retreated again in June on the back of 
increasing concerns regarding future demand 
prospects. Finally, confidence has been 
strengthening progressively since March in the 
construction sector. 
By contrast, the situation appears somewhat less 
encouraging on the households’ side. Consumer 
confidence has fluctuated around the same level 
since the end of last year. It dipped in May but 
regained the lost ground in June and remains 
below its long-term average.   
Graph 1: Confidence indicators, euro area  
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(1) Normalised. 
Source: Commission services. 
Notwithstanding the broad stagnation of 
household sentiment, confidence and leading 
indicators are now sending more upbeat signals 
than during the previous quarter, suggesting that 
some of the uncertainties that had weighed on 
confidence earlier this year have been lifted. 
ECFIN’s Economic Sentiment Indicator, which 
combines data from manufacturing, service and 
household surveys,3 progressed significantly in 
April and May before retreating slightly in June. 
This suggests that, even though a marked 
acceleration of activity is unlikely in the short run, 
the recovery is proceeding on firm grounds.  
                                                     
3  The Economic Sentiment Indicator is a weighted sum of 
several confidence indicators compiled by DG ECFIN. It 
has recently been modified in order to cover confidence in 
the service sector in addition to household sentiment and 
confidence in the manufacturing, retail and construction 
sectors. As a result it now tracks annual changes in GDP 
more closely with a correlation exceeding 90%. 
DG ECFIN’s indicator-based model for quarterly 
GDP growth paints a similar picture. It forecasts 
GDP growth to be in a range of 0.3-0.7% in the 
second quarter before accelerating slightly to 0.4-
0.8% in the third quarter. 
Graph 2: GDP growth, euro area 
(quarter-on-quarter growth) 
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(1) ECFIN’s indicator based forecast model. 
Source: Commission services. 
External trade continues to be a major 
stimulus to growth  
Estimates provided by the CPB Netherlands 
Bureau of Economic Analysis indicate that world 
trade continued to expand rapidly during the first 
months of the year. In February and March – the 
latest available data – annual real growth of world 
imports entered into double-digit territory for the 
first time since early 2001 (Graph 3).  
Graph 3: World trade  
(year-on-year % changes in volume) 
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Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Nevertheless, an inflexion has been visible since 
the beginning of the year in the quarterly 
averages. Quarter-on-quarter growth in world 
trade was less buoyant in the first quarter of 2004 
than in the second half of 2003. The slowdown 
was broad-based geographically, which might 
suggest that world trade is entering a more 
sustainable phase of growth after a very sharp 
cyclical rebound.  
Looking ahead, the short-term outlook is for a 
continued solid expansion in world trade with 
robust growth in most parts of the global 
economy.  
The US recovery consolidated in the first half of 
2004 with the arrival of the long-awaited upturn 
in employment. Output is estimated to have 
grown by 3.9% at an annual rate in the first 
quarter and appears to have expanded at a similar 
rate in the second quarter. All components of 
domestic demand contributed to the expansion, 
while net exports exerted a drag. Although 
household spending may slow somewhat in the 
months to come, short-term growth prospects 
appear reasonably solid. However, the economy’s 
internal and external imbalances continue to be a 
cause of concern for the medium-term outlook. 
The Japanese economy has been experiencing a 
significant recovery and its short-term outlook 
continues to be favourable. Prospects for key 
export markets remain good and domestic 
demand is also supporting the recovery. GDP has 
been growing now for eight successive quarters 
and has outpaced the USA in the two most recent 
quarters. On a more negative tone, current 
statistics are, to some extent, overestimating 
growth. In addition, large structural imbalances 
remain, particularly in the financial sector.  
Short-term prospects for emerging markets are 
also upbeat. Continued robust growth is expected 
in East Asian economies on the back of a strong 
international environment, competitive exchange 
rates and some policy stimulus. Latin America is 
also expected to experience solid growth, driven 
by the recoveries in Brazil and Argentina.  
The robust momentum in world trade is 
providing a strong stimulus to euro-area exports. 
After a pause in the last quarter of 2003, euro-
area exports of good and services resumed a 
growth path in the first quarter of 2004, 
expanding by 1.7% in real non-annualised terms. 
This confirms the assessment made in the March 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, that the poor 
export performance registered in the last quarter 
of 2004 was more a statistical blip than a 
consequence of the strong euro.  
Graph 4: Real effective exchange rate, euro area  
(based on CPI - index 100 = average 1990-2003) 
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Source: ECB. 
The recent weakening of the external value of the 
euro relative to its peak at the beginning of the 
year should provide further support to euro-area 
exports in the next few months. In May, the real 
effective exchange rate of the euro – based on 
CPI – had lost 2% relative to its peak in January 
and was back at its level of last summer.  
Graph 5: Manufacturers’ opinion on export prospects 
and competitiveness, euro area (1) 
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(1) Balance of positive and negative answers seasonally adjusted. 
Source: Commission services – Quarterly survey of the 
manufacturing industry. 
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The positive short-term outlook for exports is 
also reflected in manufacturing surveys. During 
the quarter to April, companies reported a 
sizeable improvement in their assessment of 
external competitiveness and further large gains 
in anticipated volumes of exports (Graph 5).  
Short-term prospects for domestic demand 
still clouded by uncertainties  
The acceleration of consumption growth in the 
euro area in the first quarter of 2004 comes after 
three quarters of near stagnation. However, it 
should be interpreted with caution for a number 
of reasons. For one thing, the strengthening of 
household spending does not appear very broad-
based in geographical terms. Available data at the 
Member State level show a pronounced 
acceleration only in France, Italy and Belgium. By 
contrast, progress was limited in Germany, the 
Netherlands and Portugal. In addition, evidence 
on a number of fronts suggests that short-term 
prospects for private spending remain uncertain. 
First, confidence indicators related to household 
spending remain disappointing. Consumer 
confidence is still below its long-term average. 
Confidence in the retail trade sector deteriorated 
again in May and June and is now back at its level 
of last December.  
Second, the short-term outlook for employment 
is sluggish. After 12 consecutive months of 
stability at 8.9%, the unemployment rate drifted 
marginally upwards to 9.0% in April and May. 
Households’ employment expectations have not 
improved significantly since the beginning of the 
year. By contrast, there have been encouraging 
signs of improvement in companies’ employment 
expectations in most business surveys in the past 
three months. However, against the background 
of a moderate recovery and cost pressures from 
oil prices, the unemployment situation is unlikely 
to improve rapidly.  
Finally, high oil prices will dent households’ 
purchasing power in the months to come, with 
CPI inflation likely to stay above 2% for the 
remainder of the year. Recent price pressures 
related to oil have begun to be visible in 
household surveys. In May and June, households’ 
assessment of future price developments 
increased somewhat (Graph 7). 
Graph 6: Private consumption and households’ 
unemployment expectations, euro area  
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(1) Quarterly year-on-year growth in %. 
(2) Quarterly averages of monthly unemployment expectations in 
consumer survey.  
Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 7: Assessment of price trends in household 
surveys, euro area  
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Source: Commission services. 
The setback in investment growth in the first 
quarter of the year illustrates the uncertainty still 
surrounding the recovery in investment. After 
increasing by 0.6% in the last quarter of 2003, 
gross fixed capital formation stalled again in the 
first quarter of 2004 (-0.1%). However, looking at 
Member States’ individual data, the setback is 
much less worrying than it may seem at first 
sight. The weak performance in capital formation 
during the first months of 2004 was entirely 
attributable to Germany where construction 
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investment contracted sharply, partly as a result 
of technical factors. In the other six Member 
States for which detailed national accounts are 
now available, capital formation actually picked 
up speed. Furthermore, Eurostat’s Q1 estimate 
for the euro area was produced before detailed 
quarterly account data were made available for 
Italy. Recently released estimates point to an 
unexpectedly sharp acceleration of investment in 
Italy. This should lead to an upward revision of 
data for the euro area as a whole with capital 
formation likely to show modest growth in the 
first quarter.  
Several factors indicate that the investment 
recovery should continue in the coming months. 
After a weak performance in January, industrial 
new orders increased strongly in February, March 
and April. In addition, fundamentals remain 
largely conducive to a recovery in investment. 
Profit margins as measured by the inverted real 
unit labour costs improved during the second 
half of 2003 (no data is yet available for the 
current year) on the back of a pick-up in labour 
productivity and persistent wage moderation 
(Graph 8). In addition, financing costs remain 
low by historical standards. Finally, business 
confidence in manufacturing and services has 
resumed an upward trend.  
Graph 8: Labour productivity and profit margins,  
euro area (annual change in %) 
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(1) Inverted real unit labour costs – index 2000=100. 
Source: Commission services. 
Notwithstanding these positive developments, a 
slight deceleration of growth in corporate debt 
suggests that some factors are still weighing on 
investment decisions in the corporate sector and 
slowing the speed of the investment recovery. 
According to ECB data, the growth rate of long-
term debt financing to the non-financial 
corporate sector declined from 5.2% in the last 
quarter of 2003 to 4.2% in the first quarter of 
2004. Despite improvements in balance sheets, 
the debt overhang remains substantial in the 
corporate sector and is seen as a possible drag on 
capital formation by many analysts. However, the 
fact that non-financial corporations have 
accumulated liquid financial assets at a rapid pace 
in recent months suggests that pressures on the 
funding side are limited.4 At this stage, the 
constraining factors on business investment are 
probably more related to a perceived lack of 
profitable non-financial investment opportunities 
and to uncertainties regarding the short-term 
growth outlook. Such uncertainties will be lifted 
progressively as signs of recovery multiply. 
The recovery is consolidating but oil prices 
pose a downside risk  
The European Commission’s Spring Economic 
Forecasts project an acceleration of GDP growth 
in the euro area from 0.4% in 2003 to 1.7% in 
2004. The recent developments in activity and 
confidence reviewed in this report are broadly in 
line with this projection. If anything, data suggest 
a pace of recovery that could be slightly more 
rapid than expected during the first half of the 
year. Risks to the recovery exist on both the 
upside and the downside.  
On the upside, there are risks attached to the 
pace of recovery of domestic demand. Several 
years of sluggish growth in private spending 
could lead to the release of pent-up demand, 
especially on the household side. The surprisingly 
good showing by private consumption in the first 
quarter in some Member States exemplifies this 
possibility. Stronger than expected world demand 
is another upside risk. 
On the downside, risks revolve around both 
domestic demand and key external prices. 
Regarding domestic demand, the recent negative 
surprise on investment growth highlights the 
uncertainty still surrounding the forces governing 
the recovery of domestic spending. As to the 
                                                     
4  See ECB Monthly Bulletin June 2004. 
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external sector, although recent developments in 
the euro exchange rate have slightly alleviated 
pressure on exporters, a further strengthening of 
the euro cannot be ruled out, especially given the 
prevailing imbalances in the US economy.  
Another important source of downside risks is 
the recent increase in oil prices. Section 2 below 
discusses the implications of higher oil prices for 
growth in the euro area. It concludes that the 
recent increase in oil prices is fairly modest 
compared with  the oil shocks of the 1970s or of 
1999-2000 and should have only a relatively small 
negative impact on growth in the euro area 
provided that it is short-lived. However, 
downside risks are non-negligible. A further or 
more lasting increase of oil prices above the 
prevailing levels, negative responses of euro-area 
wages or a higher than expected vulnerability of 
emerging markets would all imply a more 
substantial growth toll on the euro-area economy.  
Energy prices lift inflation to above 2%  
After a steady deceleration in late 2003 and early 
2004, HICP inflation again accelerated from 
March onwards. According to Eurostat’s latest 
flash estimate, it was 2.4% in June – 0.7 of a 
percentage point higher than three months 
before. While such a rapid acceleration had not 
been observed for three years, it was largely 
anticipated. It was mainly related to changes in 
energy prices. Annual changes in the energy 
component of the HICP, which accounts for 
about 8% of the underlying consumption basket, 
rose from -2% in March to 6.7% in May. The rise 
can be explained by two factors.  
¾ Firstly, the favourable base effects that 
contributed to the decline of inflation in the 
first two months of this year went into reverse 
in the subsequent three months, as oil and 
energy prices fell sharply after the start of the 
Iraq war in 2003. These base effects are 
estimated to have shaved off around 0.2 of a 
percentage point from headline inflation in 
January and February, while adding about the 
same amount in March, April and May. 
¾ Secondly, the increases in crude oil prices over 
the past few months have begun to permeate 
into consumer prices.  
Graph 9: Inflation in the euro area 
(annual change in %) (1) 
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(1) June data for HICP is based on Eurostat’s Flash Estimate.  
Source: Commission services. 
While core inflation remains lower than headline 
inflation, the downward trend in core inflation, 
visible in Graph 9, has come to an end. Core 
inflation as measured by the HICP excluding 
energy and unprocessed food has been above 2% 
since March. 
The European Commission Spring 2004 
Forecasts projected a decrease of the euro-area 
annual inflation rate from 2.1% in 2003 to 1.8% 
in 2004 and 1.6% in 2005. The anticipated 
deceleration of inflation reflected the impact of 
the appreciation of the euro, the prevailing 
negative output gap, muted wage pressures and a 
cyclical rebound in productivity. While these 
factors are still expected to exert downward 
pressure on prices, recent developments in energy 
prices are likely to have a significant upward 
impact on the short-term inflation outlook and 
suggest that inflation will remain above 2% for 
longer than expected.  
A key aspect of the inflation outlook is whether 
the impulse from energy prices will initiate 
second-round effects through higher wage claims. 
Past experience shows that this is more likely to 
be the case when economic activity is strong 
and/or when the hike in energy prices feeds into 
inflation expectations. In this respect, the 
following developments in inflation expectations 
should be a source of concern: 
¾ As already highlighted, households’ short-
term inflation expectations as measured by the 
EU consumer survey drifted upwards in May 
after having remained around a historical low 
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level for almost a year. If sustained, this 
increase could spill over into wage claims. 
¾ Purchasing managers have reported rising 
input prices. Reuters PMI corresponding sub-
index has increased considerably over the last 
few months, for both manufacturing and 
services. 
¾ Long-term inflation expectations embedded in 
French index-linked bonds have been on an 
upward trend since summer 2003. In June 
2004, the break-even rate was close to 2.3%. 
Reassuringly, the experience of the 1999-2000 oil 
shock suggests that higher oil prices do not 
automatically become entrenched in higher trend 
inflation. A threefold increase in oil prices led to 
energy price inflation in the euro area rising at 
two-digit levels throughout 2000. The 
contribution of energy prices to overall HICP 
inflation increased sharply. Based on annual 
averages, energy price inflation added 1.1 
percentage points to headline HICP inflation in 
2000, pushing it to 2.1%, up from 1.1% in 1999. 
However, neither inflation expectations nor wage 
growth were significantly affected by these 
developments. Available data suggest that, in the 
absence of substantial second-round wage effects, 
most of the impact from oil prices takes about 
1½ years to feed through into overall HICP 
inflation. In line with this rule of thumb, growth 
in HICP excluding energy peaked in January 2002 
and fell over the following year.  
Contrasting developments in monetary and 
financial conditions  
Recent developments in monetary conditions in 
the euro area have been conducive to the 
economic recovery. The external value of the 
euro has come down from the high level reached 
at the beginning of the year. The depreciation 
mostly took place in March and April and was 
partly offset by a renewed strengthening in May. 
In May, the euro real exchange rate was around 
2% below its peak in January. With fairly stable 
real interest rates, recent changes in monetary 
conditions, as measured by the MCI, have been 
dominated by fluctuations in the external value of 
the euro. Hence, monetary conditions eased 
between January and April before tightening 
slightly again in May (Graph 10).  
Graph 10: Monetary conditions, euro area 
(index January 1999 = 0) 
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Source: Commission services  
Recent developments in longer-term financial 
conditions have been somewhat less favourable. 
Government bond yields in the USA and the 
euro area have edged up since March 2004 
(Graph 11). By end-June, the yield on 10-year US 
government bonds was at 4.7%, around 90 basis 
points above the level seen in March. Shadowing 
this development to some extent, yields on the 
German 10-year bonds – which is considered as 
the benchmark for the euro area – rose by 40 
basis points to almost 4.3%. While neither the 
speed of the increase nor the current level of 
interest rates are exceptional, recent 
developments may signal a reversal of the 
downward trend observed since the last months 
of 2003.  
Graph 11: Yields on 10-year bonds,  
euro area and USA 
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(1) German benchmark. 
Source: Datastream. 
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A turnaround in expectations concerning the 
future path of central bank interest rates figures 
prominently among the explanatory factors for 
the observed increase in bond rates. This has 
been particularly true in the USA. Late June, the 
Fed’s main policy rate had been at 1% for a year. 
Economic data releases pointing to accelerating 
growth, a tightening of the labour market and 
emerging price pressures have led many financial 
market participants to expect the US FED to 
tighten the monetary stance earlier and more 
forcefully than previously thought. Forward rates 
indicate that market participants now expect the 
FED to raise policy rates quite markedly 
(Graph 12). Spreads in the euro are have also 
increased, but by a considerably smaller 
magnitude. This is consistent with the view that 
the ECB has more leeway to keep policy rates at 
a low level than the FED, where short-term rates 
are at an extraordinarily low level. 
Graph 12: Money market forward rates,  
euro area and USA (June 2004) 
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Source: Datastream. 
More generally, interest rates on bond markets 
have been at a historically low level for some time 
and the recent increase probably represents a 
return to a more balanced level. Interest rates 
tend to move with the business cycle, as returns 
on capital, inflation expectations and risk 
premiums tend to be lower in downturns than in 
expansions. These factors may have returned to 
levels more in line with the acceleration of 
growth witnessed in many parts of the global 
economy. There is for instance some evidence 
that recent increases in nominal bond yields 
reflect both an increase in the underlying real 
interest rate and higher expected inflation.5 
However, cyclical factors are pushing yields more 
significantly in the USA than in the euro area, as a 
result of a stronger increase of inflation 
expectations and better growth perspectives in 
the USA.6 
Finally, there is evidence that perceived 
uncertainty among market participants has edged 
up again after having been on a downward trend 
from autumn 2003. This can be seen in a rising 
expected volatility on US bonds, as captured in 
option prices. The level of volatility is, however, 
still considerably below multi-annual averages.  
Turning to stock prices, the upward trend which 
had been noticeable for a year came to a halt in 
early March in both the USA and the euro area. 
By mid-May 2004, stock market prices had lost 
between 8 and 10% (depending on the index 
chosen) relative to their previous peak. A 
recovery has been under way since mid-May but 
by end-June stock prices had only partly 
recouped the losses incurred in March and April. 
The weakness in stock prices is primarily a 
reflection of higher long-term interest rates. 
Higher oil prices and increased uncertainty may 
also have played a role. These negative factors 
have more than offset positive developments in 
terms of corporate profitability.  
Graph 13: Stock market indices, euro area and USA 
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Source: Datastream. 
                                                     
5  The yield on the inflation-indexed bonds of the French 
government has risen by more than 40 basis points since 
mid-March. 
6  10-years bond market interest rates are now about 40basis 
points lower in the euro area than in the USA. The 
difference was slightly negative from December to March. 
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2. How vulnerable is the euro-area 
economy to higher oil prices? 
Recent sharp increases in oil prices have renewed 
concerns about their potential impact on 
economic activity and inflation. This section 
discusses recent developments in oil markets and 
assesses the vulnerability of the euro-area 
economy to higher oil prices.  
Recent developments in oil prices  
In US dollar terms, the rising trend in oil prices 
has been evident for over a year, while the 
upward trend in euro dates to February this year. 
After reaching a low of about 23$ per barrel at 
the end of April 2003, the price of Brent crude 
increased steadily, peaking at above 38$ in early 
June 2004 before easing somewhat again to about 
35$ by end-June. 
Graph 14: Oil price  
(Brent crude, price per barrel, monthly averages) 
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Source: Commission services. 
For euro-area companies and consumers, the 
appreciation of the euro initially cushioned the 
rise in the price of oil. However, in recent 
months, the slight decline in the value of the euro 
against the dollar has allowed the price increase 
to permeate through to the euro area. Based on 
monthly averages, the price of Brent increased by 
44% in US$ and 29% in euro between April 2003 
and June 2004. The cushioning role of the euro is 
even more significant when looking at price 
developments since early 2002, with the price of 
Brent increasing by close to 79% in US$ terms 
and only 31% in euro terms over the period.  
High prices reflect supply factors with OPEC 
playing a key role… 
A number of factors, on both the demand and 
supply sides have contributed to rising oil prices 
over the last year. On the supply side, OPEC has 
sought to offset the fall in the value of the US 
dollar over the past year by maintaining prices 
above its 22-28 US$ price range. This is shown by 
developments in OPEC output. In the first 
quarter of 2004, OPEC production was 4%, 
higher than a year before but much of the 
increase reflected the return to near capacity of 
Venezuelan output, following earlier industrial 
relations problems (Table 3). Importantly, Saudi 
Arabia, the leading OPEC producer, reduced its 
output by 5% over the period despite large spare 
capacity.  
Table 3: OPEC crude oil  production and spare 
capacity (million barrels per day) (1) 
 Q1 2003 Q1 2004 Spare Capacity (2) 
Algeria 1.04 1.14 0.11 
Indonesia 1.04 0.98 0.12 
Iran 3.79 3.92 0.08 
Kuwait 1.77 1.95 0.35 
Libya 1.39 1.47 0.08 
Neutral Zone 0.6 0.6 --- 
Nigeria 2.13 2.33 0.22 
Qatar 0.74 0.75 0.10 
Saudi Arabia 8.61 8.21 1.29 
UAE 2.29 2.3 0.15 
Venezuela 1.3 2.17 0.18 
Iraq 2.12 2.11 0.69 
Total 26.82 27.94 3.37 
(1) Not including NGLs 
(2) Spare capacity compared to Q1 04 output. Capacity levels can 
be reached in 30 days and sustained for 90 days. Saudi Arabia can 
produce a further 1.0 m b/d within 90 days 
Source: IEA – Monthly Oil Market Report. 
A longer term look at global oil supply (Table 4) 
shows that increased output since 2000 has come 
from non-OPEC sources, particularly Russia, 
despite the OPEC countries accounting for much 
of the existing spare capacity.  
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The announcement on June 3, after the meeting 
of OPEC oil ministers, that the production quota 
was to be increased by 2 million barrels per day 
from July 1 and by a further 0.5 million barrels 
per day from August 1, apparently marked a 
reversal of OPEC’s attempt to restrict output. 
However, it also reflected the fact that the fall in 
demand that OPEC had anticipated for spring 
2004 had not come about. Moreover, it is unclear 
by how much production will actually be 
increased given that OPEC crude oil production 
in April exceeded official production quotas by 
an estimated 2.3 million barrels per day. 
…as well as demand pressures related to 
economic growth and geopolitical concerns 
Oil demand has increased as a result of both 
short and longer-term factors. The strong 
recovery of the global economy has resulted in 
strong growth in the demand for oil. The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) projects the 
rise in world oil demand in 2004 to be the largest 
absolute increase in 16 years.  
China’s fast rising energy consumption is fuelling 
much of the growth in oil demand. The IEA 
projects that Chinese consumption will rise by up 
to 20% on an annual basis in the second quarter 
of 2004, after growth of 18.5% in the first 
quarter. In addition to fast economic growth 
rates, the share of Chinese energy demand 
accounted for by oil continues to rise, boosted by 
strong growth in car-ownership. Table 4 shows 
that China is expected to account for around a 
third of the growth in world oil demand between 
2000 and 2004. Overall demand in non-OECD 
countries is expected to grow by a total of 11% 
between 2000 and 2004 (accounting for over 70% 
of the overall increase in demand), compared 
with 3% for OECD countries. 
But a considerable share of the latest surge in 
demand appears to have been triggered by 
shorter-term factors. Concerns regarding security 
of supply resulting from geopolitical factors in 
the Middle East, which have been heightened by 
terrorist attacks on oil workers’ compounds in 
Saudi Arabia, have encouraged strategic 
purchases. Geopolitical concerns have also 
fuelled speculative buying from hedge funds and 
traders, alongside continued demand from the 
growing number of commodity funds. This 
strategic and speculative demand comes on top 
of the boost to demand created by exceptionally 
harsh winter conditions in the US and higher-
than-usual demand to build stocks due to the 
existing low stock environment, particularly in 
the US.  
The mixture of short and longer-term factors 
affecting the oil price is reflected in developments 
in futures prices. Futures prices in late June 
showed that the price of Brent was expected to 
fall steadily to below $30 /barrel by the end of 
2006. But this represents a premium of around 
$6, compared with the future price for mid-2006 
which was being traded in June 2003. Thus whilst 
much of the recent price rise is clearly the result 
of short-term, possibly in part speculative factors, 
markets also expect some of the factors which 
have raised the price in recent months to persist 
into the medium-term. 
Table 4: The oil market – Supply and demand (million barrels per day) 
     2004 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total (1) Q1
Supply 76.7 76.9 76.6 79.4 ---     81.8
- OPEC 30.7 30.2 28.6 30.5 --- 31.9
- Non-OPEC 46.1 46.7 48.1 48.9 50.1 49.8
     of which Former Soviet Union 7.9 8.6 9.4 10.3 11.1 10.8
Demand 76.2 76.8 77.0 78.7 80.6 81.0
- OECD 47.8 47.8 47.8 48.5 49.0 49.7
- Non-OECD 28.4 29.0 29.3 30.2 31.6 31.2
     of which China 4.7 4.7 4.9 5.5 6.2 6.2
Changes in Stocks 0.6 0.1 -0.4 0.7 --- 0.8
(1) IEA estimate for 2004 as a whole. 
Source: International Energy Agency – Monthly Oil Market Report May 2004. 
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A comparatively small shock the impact of 
which will depend on several factors 
By historical standards, notably in comparison 
with the oil price shocks of the 1970s or 1999-
2000, the increase in oil prices registered in the 
past months represents only a modest shock to 
the euro-area economy. Based on annual 
averages, the dollar price of the crude rose by 
371% between 1972 and 1974, by 179% between 
1978 and 1980 and by 116% between 1998 and 
2000. In euro, the price rises were 343%, 156% 
and 162% respectively. By contrast, the increase 
observed in recent Months is small. In June 2004, 
prices in euro were only 35% above the lows 
briefly reached after the beginning of the Iraq war 
last year. They were also about 25% above, both 
the level in February 2004 and the average level 
in 2003. Such a rise does not qualify as a severe 
oil shock. Moreover, the real price of oil remains 
significantly below the price sustained in the first 
half of the 1980s following the second oil price 
shock (Graph 15).  
Graph 15: Real and nominal oil prices  
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Source: Commission services. 
In addition, the euro-area economy has 
significantly reduced its direct dependence on oil 
since the 1970s (Graph 16). Oil dependency, both 
in terms of net imports as a proportion of GDP 
and consumption as proportion of GDP, has 
fallen by over 40%.  
Another factor that limits the economy’s 
exposure to oil prices is the fact that taxes levied 
on fuel products in the euro area are dominated 
by duties calculated per physical unit, as opposed 
to ad-valorem taxes. The former do not rise as 
the price of oil rises. As a consequence, 
percentage changes in after-tax prices of fuel 
products tend to be much lower than 
corresponding percentage changes in oil prices. 
Duties on fuel products levied on physical units 
have increased in the euro area over the last 30 
years, and generally account for around half of 
the final price of petrol. 
Graph 16: The dependence of the euro area on oil (1) 
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(1) Tonnes of oil equivalent per thousand 1995 euro. 
(2) TPES: total primary energy supply.   
Source: IEA and Commission services. 
Turning to the economic impact, an increase in 
oil prices entails a transfer of income from oil-
consuming to oil-producing countries. 
Consumers and producers in the oil-consuming 
countries share the burden of the transfer, via 
higher consumer prices for the former and 
pressures on profit margins for the latter. The 
cost of the transfer is determined not only by the 
economy’s dependence on oil but also by its 
resilience to external shocks. In this respect 
several factors appear important.  
¾ The inflationary impact of an increase in oil 
prices will be magnified if wage earners try to 
recoup losses in purchasing power through 
higher wage claims. Such second-round 
effects will force monetary authorities to 
tighten their policy.  
¾ More generally, the impact of higher oil prices 
will depend on the prevailing macroeconomic 
environment. An increase in oil prices is likely 
to inflict more damage if it hits an economy in 
a situation of overheating or accelerating 
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inflation. The response of macroeconomic 
policy is also crucial.  
¾ Resilience will also depend on the response of 
household and business sentiment. An oil 
price shock may have a negative bearing on 
household and business confidence if, for 
instance, it heralds increased geopolitical and 
macroeconomic uncertainty.  
¾ Finally, a critical factor will be economic 
agents’ expectations regarding the length of 
the rise in oil prices. A rise perceived to be 
temporary may affect domestic demand more 
moderately because it may induce households 
to smooth consumption by temporarily 
reducing savings. By contrast, a rise perceived 
to be permanent will encourage companies to 
proceed with costly changes in technologies 
aimed at substituting oil with capital.  
Lessons from the 1999-00 oil shock are 
encouraging 
If we look at the response of the euro-area 
economy to the previous oil price increase in 
1999-2000 – the first since the inception of EMU 
– the message is encouraging.  
Graph 17: Oil prices and wages, euro area  
(quarterly data) 
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(1) Year-on-year changes in nominal wages. 
(2) Euro per barrel of Brent.  
Source: Commission services. 
Regarding labour markets, there is little evidence 
that the 1999-2000 oil shock had an impact on 
nominal wage developments (Graph 17). Wage 
moderation prevailed in a context of 
continuously decreasing unemployment. This 
positive development reflects the fact that labour 
markets are functioning better than at the time of 
the oil shocks of the 1970s and, in particular, that 
automatic wage indexation is less prevalent. 
Given that the labour market is currently looser 
than in 2000 with unemployment still increasing, 
conditions are in place to ensure that the wage 
response to the recent oil price increase will be 
muted.  
Turning to possible negative confidence effects, 
there has been little correlation between 
household or business sentiment and oil prices 
since the late 1990s and, insofar as any can be 
observed, it is – rather counterintuitively – 
positive. This is particularly clear in the case of 
manufacturing sentiment as measured by the 
Business Climate Indicator (Graph 18).  
Graph 18: Oil prices and manufacturing confidence, 
euro area (monthly data) 
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(1) Euro per barrel of Brent. 
Source: Commission services. 
Looking further into households’ behaviour, 
Graph 19 plots the euro-area saving ratio 
together with the price of Brent. Since the 
beginning of EMU, there has been no evidence 
of a rise in precautionary savings at times of 
higher oil prices. If anything, the inverse relation 
shown in the graph could be indicative of a 
certain degree of consumption smoothing. This is 
in line with research presented in a previous issue 
of the QREA which suggested that private 
consumption in the euro area follows a so-called 
error correction pattern.7 Error correction 
patterns imply that abrupt changes in disposable 
                                                     
7  Quarterly report on the Euro Area, Volume 3 No. 1 
(2004), pp. 13-20. 
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income are partly smoothed out by changes in the 
saving ratio. In this context, some consumption 
smoothing in case of large swings in oil prices is 
likely.   
Graph 19: Oil prices and household saving, euro area  
(quarterly data) 
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(1) As a share of GDP in % - scale is inverted. 
(2) Euro per barrel of Brent.  
Source: Commission services and Fagan et al. (2001). 
A small impact but significant downside risks  
Overall, the analysis presented here suggests that 
the recent increase in oil prices is likely to 
represent only a relatively small constraint on the 
euro-area recovery. Three main arguments 
support this sanguine assessment. First, the oil 
price increase at this stage remains relatively small 
in historical terms and the economy’s exposure to 
oil has decreased considerably. Second, the 
analysis of developments in the oil market 
indicates that the recent increase should be 
essentially temporary. Finally, the experience of 
the 1999-2000 oil shock suggests that the euro-
area economy can now absorb higher oil prices 
more effectively than in the past. The stability-
oriented framework of EMU, with its clear 
objective in terms of price stability, is likely to 
lead to an appropriate policy response and to 
promote an adequate behaviour by all economic 
agents, particularly in terms of wages.  
This relatively benign assessment is also backed 
by model simulations which indicate that a hike 
 
Box 1: Simulating the impact of an increase in oil prices  
 
The table presents two simulations carried out with DG ECFIN’s QUEST model. The two scenarios correspond 
respectively to a temporary and a permanent 25% increase in oil price, occurring at the beginning of the year. It is 
important to stress that these simulations are purely illustrative and represent a bigger shock than the one incurred so 
far. If current trends are maintained, the average oil price in 2004 will be higher than assumed in the Commission’s 
Spring 2004 Forecasts but, at about 10%, the increase will be much less than the one simulated here.  
 
In the temporary increase scenario, euro-area GDP is reduced by slightly more than 0.3% in the first year. The oil price is 
back at its baseline level in the second year, but the negative shock on activity unwinds only progressively and GDP 
is still close to 0.2% lower than the baseline that year. In the third year, the impact of the shock is no longer 
noticeable. In the permanent increase scenario, GDP in the euro area is slightly less than 0.3% lower than the baseline in 
the first year.(*) The negative impact continues to be felt in the second and third year with GDP respectively 0.4% 
lower than the baseline.  
 
Impact of a 25% increase in oil price, euro area  
(differences in the level of the variables relative to baseline in %) 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Scenario 1: A temporary increase in oil price  
Oil price  25 0 0 
GDP  -0.34 -0.15 -0.04 
Consumer prices 0.19 0.09 0.02 
Scenario 2: A permanent increase in oil price  
Oil price  25 25 25 
GDP -0.29 -0.38 -0.41 
Consumer prices 0.22 0.28 0.31 
Source: Commission Services 
 
(*) An oil price hike that is anticipated to be transitory will put less pressure on economic agents to adjust and should thereby imply lower output 
effects. However, for the euro area, the first-year GDP effect is slightly smaller for a permanent than for a transitory shock, because there is a 
small depreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar in that case. 
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in oil prices of the magnitude registered in the 
past months only has a limited impact on growth. 
According to DG ECFIN’s QUEST model, a 
25% increase in oil prices occurring at the 
beginning of the year and persisting for a year 
would shave 0.3% off GDP in the euro area in 
the first year. The negative effect would be partly 
recouped in the second year with GDP only 0.2% 
below its base line level and fully offset in the 
third year (see Box 1). Furthermore, it is worth 
stressing that, although oil prices in euro have 
risen by about 25% in the past four months, the 
shock for 2004 as a whole is likely to be much 
smaller if current trends are pursued. If the oil 
price registered in June is maintained throughout 
the remainder of year, the average annual increase 
in the Brent price will be of only about 12% in 
2004 as a whole. The average price in 2004 will 
also be only 11% higher than assumed in the 
Commission Spring 2004 Forecasts. This 
represents a much more modest shock than 
assumed in the simulations above.  
Nevertheless, recent developments in oil markets 
also pose significant downside risks. In particular, 
a further increase of oil prices relative to 
prevailing levels, especially if more permanent, 
could inflict more damage to the euro-area.  
Another significant risk is linked to the current 
cyclical position of the euro-area economy. In the 
past, large hikes in oil prices generally hit the 
euro-area economy at times of a positive output 
gap. In contrast, the output gap is currently still 
negative. This should contribute to moderate 
wage claims in the face of rising inflation. 
However, the still relatively weak cyclical position 
could also make business and consumer 
confidence more vulnerable to oil prices.  
Finally, some downside risks are attached to the 
response of emerging markets and world trade to 
the hike in oil prices. Previous oil shocks have 
always been associated with a slowdown in world 
trade as oil-importing countries had a higher 
propensity to consume than oil-exporting 
countries. The question of the vulnerability of 
world trade to higher oil price could be critical at 
this juncture. First, the euro-area recovery still 
relies heavily on trade. Second, growth in world 
trade may be more sensitive to rises in oil prices 
than in the past due to the growing importance of 
emerging markets such as China. Emerging 
markets also tend to be more energy-intensive 
than more advanced economies and therefore 
more exposed to higher oil prices.  
Possible large differences between countries 
While the recent increase in oil prices is likely to 
have only a limited incidence on the euro-area 
economy as a whole, its impact could be more 
significant in some Member States than others. 
As shown in Table 5, the contribution of energy 
to HICP inflation during the 1999-2000 oil shock 
varied greatly between countries. Over that 
period, the increase in the energy component of 
the HICP directly dented households’ purchasing 
power by 2.2pp in Greece and Belgium but by 
only 1.2pp in Italy and 0.3pp in Portugal.8  
Table 5: Impact of the 1999-2000 oil shock on 
HICP, euro area 
 
Change in 
energy comp. 
of HICP (1) 
Energy 
weight in 
HICP (2) 
Contrib. to 
change in 
HICP (3) 
Belgium 22.2 101 2.2 
Germany 21.7 99 2.1 
Greece 31.1 71 2.2 
Spain 21.2 69 1.5 
France 18.9 87 1.7 
Ireland 19.3 99 1.9 
Italy 17.3 70 1.2 
Luxemburg 30.5 67 2.0 
Netherlands 15.5 89 1.4 
Austria 16.4 85 1.4 
Portugal 2.8 92 0.3 
Finland 19.2 108 2.1 
EU 12 19.8 87 1.7 
(1) Percentage point change in energy component of HICP 
between January 1999 and March 2000. 
(2)Weight of energy component in Member State’s HICP (1999), 
total HICP=1000 
(3) Contribution of energy component to change in HICP in %. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Differences in oil intensity between Member 
States are the primary reason why the effect of oil 
price rises may vary between Member States. 
Graph 20 shows a positive relation between 
Member States’ oil intensities and the 
                                                     
8  Further indirect prices increases will take place as 
manufacturers pass through higher input costs into their 
sales prices. These indirect effects are not captured in 
Table 5 but may entail a substantial further cut in 
households’ purchasing power. 
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contribution of the energy component to total 
HICP inflation during the 1999-2000 oil shock. 
The R2 for the 12 Member States is only 0.07, but 
once two clear outliers (Luxemburg and Portugal) 
are excluded, oil intensity accounts for about 55% 
of the variance in the HICP contributions 
between Member States.  
Graph 20: Oil intensity and the contribution of energy 
to HICP inflation, euro area (1) - 1999-2000 oil shock  
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(1) Excludes Portugal and Luxemburg, whose oil intensities are 92 
and 149 respectively. 
(2) Oil consumption in MTOE divided by GDP in PPS.  
(3) See last column of Table 5. 
Source: Commission services, IEA. 
However, other factors will also affect the 
transmission from oil price rises to CPI rises.  
Firstly, excise duties on petrol vary considerably 
between Member States (Graph 21). Because 
excise duties on energy prices in the euro area are 
calculated on volume, rather than value, they act 
as a buffer between rises in oil prices and rises in 
petrol prices.  
In the past, Member States have sometimes 
responded to oil price increases by adjusting 
indirect taxes on some oil products. This 
behaviour aggravates disparities in the price 
response of Member States and can therefore 
complicate the single monetary policy. 
Furthermore, changes in taxes tend to distort the 
price signals provided by the market about the 
relative scarcity of oil and therefore diminish the 
effectiveness of the economy’s response. 
Finally, the pass-through of increased crude oil 
prices into higher consumer prices may also be 
influenced by local market conditions. A 
Commission report9 in 2000 noted that the major 
differences in consumer prices for oil products 
between Member States, cannot be explained 
solely by cost factors, but points to the existence 
of oligopolistic behaviour and a lack of 
competition in distribution. 
Graph 21: Excise duties on petrol in Member States 
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(1) Average excise duty in euro on 1000 litres of petrol of euro-
super 95, April 2004. 
Source: Commission services 
In addition to factors affecting the pass through 
of oil prices, another major source of potential 
country differences in the impact of higher oil 
prices is related to labour markets. Differences in 
labour market institutions and conditions 
between Member States can affect the extent to 
which workers seek to protect their real wages in 
the face of a sustained increase in oil prices. 
Estimations of wage equations point to large 
differences in the response of wages to terms-of-
trade shocks across Member States10. The 
existence of wage indexation schemes in a limited 
number of countries is an example of these 
differences. It is also worth noting that there is a 
substantial asymmetry in the potential 
interactions between wage developments and 
monetary policy. Whereas second-round wage 
effects in the larger Member States will affect the 
euro-area average inflation rate and are therefore 
likely to trigger a rapid monetary policy response, 
this is not the case of smaller Member States. 
Wage earners in the latter may therefore be less 
inclined to moderate their wage claims.  
                                                     
9  European Commission (2000), ‘The European Union’s 
Oil Supply’, DG Energy and Transport. 
10  See European Commission (2003), ‘The EU economy 
2003 review’, Chapter 4, European Economy, No. 6/2003. 
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Focus 
II. Fiscal policy: mid-year review 
According to the updated Stability Programmes presented by Member States in autumn 2003, the nominal budget balance 
in the euro area as a whole is expected to improve by almost half a percentage point of GDP in 2004, followed by a similar 
improvement in 2005. The projected improvement relies heavily on budgetary consolidation in the larger Member States. 
However, recent evidence paints a much less sanguine picture of budgetary consolidation in the euro area. The Commission 
Spring 2004 Economic Forecasts project no improvement in the nominal budget deficit of the euro area in 2004, leaving it 
close to 3% of GDP, and only a marginal improvement in 2005, unless policies change. Cyclically adjusted balances are 
also forecast to remain virtually unchanged. Furthermore, data released since the spring forecasts suggest that there is a risk 
that deficits in several countries could be higher than projected by the Commission in the spring. 
 
1. Budgetary developments in 2004 
Since the submission of the updated stability 
programmes in autumn 2003, the short-term 
growth prospects for the euro area have been 
virtually unchanged. Indications that the 
economic recovery is materialising imply that 
actual growth will be relatively close to the 
assumptions made in the programmes in most 
Member States. In 2004, growth in all countries, 
except Italy, is expected to be within close range 
of the programme assumptions (Table 6).  
According to the updated programmes, the 
nominal budget balances are expected to 
improve by 0.4% of GDP to 2.3% of GDP. 
This projected improvement between 2003 and 
2004 is heavily dependent on budgetary 
consolidation in the larger Member States. 
Germany, France and Italy anticipate an 
improvement of the nominal and cyclically 
Table 6: Comparison between Commission Spring 2004 Economic Forecasts (COM) and the autumn 
2003 updates of the Stability Programme (SP) for 2004 (% of GDP) 
 Real GDP growth in 2004 
Nominal budget balance Cyclically adjusted budget 
balance (1) 
2004 2004 
 
SP 
scenario 
COM 
forecast 
2003 
SP 
target 
COM 
forecast 
Differ. 
COM – SP 
2003 
  SP implicit 
target (2) 
COM 
forecast 
BE 1.8 2.0 0.3 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 0.8 0.6 0.0 
DE 1.7 1.5 -3.9 -3¼  -3.6 -0.35 -3.2 -2½ -3.0 
EL 4.2 4.0 -3.2 -1.2 -3.2 -2.0 -3.8 -1.8 -4.1 
ES 3.0 2.8 0.3 0.0  0.4  0.4 0.4 ---- 0.6 
FR 1.7 1.7 -4.1 -3.6 -3.7 -0.1 -3.9 -2.0 -3.4 
IE 3.3 3.7 0.2 -1.1 -0.8 0.3 0.1 -0.5 -0.3 
IT 1.9 1.2 -2.4 -2.2 -3.2 -1.0 -1.9 -1.6 -2.6 
LU 2.0 2.4 -0.1 -0.7 -1.2 -0.5 1.3 1.0 0.6 
NL 1.0 1.0 -3.2 -2.3 -3.5 -1.2 -2.0 -0.7 -1.7 
AT 1.9 1.8 -1.3 -0.7 -1.1 -0.4 -1.0 -0.4 -0.9 
PT 1.0 0.8 -2.8 -2.8 -3.4 -0.6 -1.8 -1.1 -2.1 
FI 2.7 2.6 2.3 1.7 2.0 0.3 2.3 2.4 2.1 
EU-12 2.0 1.7 -2.7 -2.3 -2.7 -0.4 -2.2 -1.5 -2.2 
(1)  Estimates based on the Production Function approach except for DE, ES and AT for which a Hodrick-Prescott filter is used.  
(2) Calculations are based on information provided in the SPs. 
Source : Commission services. 
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adjusted balances by at least 0.5% of GDP.  
In sharp contrast with the relatively favourable 
picture displayed by the updated Stability 
Programmes, the Commission Spring 2004 
Economic Forecasts project the euro-area 
nominal budget deficit in 2004 to remain 
unchanged relative to 2003 at 2.7%. Assuming 
no changes in fiscal policy, nine out of twelve 
Member States are expected to miss the 
budgetary targets set in the updates of the 
Stability Programme.11 Greece, Italy and the 
Netherlands would even miss their target by 
one percentage point of GDP or more.  
In 2003, nominal budget deficits turned out to 
be higher than (or equal to) 3% of GDP in four 
countries. According to the Commission Spring 
2004 Economic Forecasts, the situation will 
deteriorate further this year despite an improved 
                                                     
11  The economic forecasts of the Commission are based 
on the “no policy change” assumption. Measures which 
have been publicly announced are taken into account in 
the forecasts, while general plans, which are not known 
in sufficient detail, are excluded from the forecasts. For 
2005, as the budget is not yet elaborated, the "no-policy 
change" assumption implies the extrapolation of 
measures and trends that are known at the time of 
completion of the forecasts. 
economic outlook, with six countries 
anticipated to post nominal budget deficits 
exceeding 3% of GDP.  
2. Budgetary prospects for 2005 
For 2005, almost all programme updates assume 
an acceleration of growth compared to 2004. At 
euro-area level, the overall difference between 
the updated programmes and the Commission’s 
Spring 2004 Economic Forecasts is of a similar 
magnitude as in 2004, with GDP growth about 
0.3 percentage point higher in the updates. 
However, in several Member States the 
expected divergences from the programmes’ 
growth assumptions are larger than for 2004. 
Hence, in seven Member States, growth is 
expected to be around half a percentage point 
lower in the Commission forecast than assumed 
in the updated programmes.  
On the basis of the updated programmes the 
nominal budget deficit of the euro area is 
projected to be 1.8% of GDP in 2005. 
However, the Commission’s Spring 2004 
Economic Forecasts project a deficit of 2.6% of 
GDP. Table 7 indicates that, according to the 
Commission forecasts, nine Member States are 
Table 7: Comparison between Commission Spring 2004 Forecasts (COM) and autumn 2003 
updates of Stability Programmes (SP) for 2005 (% of GDP) 
 Real GDP growth in 2005 Nominal budget balance 
Cyclically  adjusted budget 
balance (1) 
 
SP 
scenario 
COM 
forecast 
SP 
target 
COM 
forecast 
Difference 
COM – SP 
SP implicit 
target (2) 
COM  
forecast 
BE 2.5 2.5 0.0 -0.7 -0.7 0.1 -0.5 
DE 2¼  1.8 -2½ -2.8 -0.3 -2.0 -2.5 
EL 3.8 3.3 -0.5 -2.8 -2.3 -1.1 -3.8 
ES 3.0 3.3 0.1 0.6 -0.5 --- 0.7 
FR 2.5 2.4 -2.9 -3.6 -0.7 -1.4 -3.3 
IE 5.2 4.6 -1.4 -1.0 0.4 -0.4 -0.2 
IT 2.5 2.1 -1.5 -4.0 -2.5 -1.1 -3.6 
LU 3.8 3.1 -2.3 -2.3 0.0 0.6 1.2 
NL 2½  1.6 -1.6 -3.3 -1.7 -0.5 -1.3 
AT 2.5 2.5 -1.5 -1.9 -0.4 -1.3 -1.8 
PT 2.8 2.2 -2.2 -3.8 -1.6 -0.6 -2.6 
FI 2.4 2.7 2.1 2.1 0.0 2.4 2.2 
EU-12 2.6 2.3 -1.8 -2.6 -0.8 -1.2 -2.2 
(1)  Estimates based on the Production Function approach except for DE, ES and AT for which a Hodrick-Prescott filter is used.  
(2) Calculations are based on information provided in the SPs. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table 8: Debt developments according to the updates of the Stability Programmes and Commission Spring 
2004 Economic Forecasts (COM) (in % of GDP) 
  
  SP scenario COM Forecast Difference COM - SP 
 2003 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 
BE 102.3 97.6 93.6 97.4 94.3 -0.2 0.7 
DE 64.0 65.0 65½  65.6 66.1 0.6 0.6 
EL 101.7 98.5 94.6 102.8 101.7 4.3 7.1 
ES 51.8 49.6 47.7 48.0 45.1 -1.6 -2.6 
FR 61.4 62.8 63.2 64.6 65.6 1.8 2.4 
IE 33.1 33.3 33.5 32.4 32.6 -0.9 -0.9 
IT 106.0 105.0 103.0 106.0 106.0 1.0 3.0 
LU 4.9 5.2 5.0 4.5 3.8 -0.7 -1.2 
NL 54.0 54.5 53.7 56.3 58.6 1.8 4.9 
AT 66.4 65.8 64.1 65.5 65.3 -0.3 1.2 
PT 59.5 60.0 59.7 60.7 62.0 0.7 2.3 
FI 45.1 44.7 44.9 44.5 44.3 -0.2 -0.6 
EU-12 70.1 70.0 69.4 70.9 70.9 0.9 1.5 
Source: Commission services. 
 
expected to miss their budgetary target, four of 
them by more than one percentage point of 
GDP.  
The difference between programme targets and 
the Commission’s forecasts for 2005 partly 
reflects the gap already accumulated in 2004 
combined with the difference in projected 
economic growth for 2005. They also reflect the 
fact that the 2005 figures in the programme 
updates depend, in varying degrees, on as yet 
unspecified budgetary measures that are not 
taken into account in the Commission forecasts. 
Developments in the cyclically-adjusted balance. The 
expected developments in nominal budget 
balances are broadly reflected in the cyclically-
adjusted balances (CAB). This implies 
significant discrepancies between the 
Commission forecasts and the updated 
programmes. On the basis of the programmes, 
the cyclically-adjusted balance for the euro area 
is expected to improve from a deficit of 1.9% in 
2003 to a deficit of 1.5% in 2004 and of 1.2% in 
2005. However, the Commission Spring 2004 
Economic Forecasts, starting from a worse 
initial position in 2003 (a CAB of -2.2%), show 
no improvement in 2004 and 2005, implying a 
shortfall of 1% in 2005 vis-à-vis the 
programmes.  
Behind the unchanged cyclically-adjusted 
balance of -2.2% of GDP  in the period 2003-
2005 for the euro area as a whole, there are 
marked differences between Member States. 
Whereas five Member States (Belgium, Spain, 
Ireland, Luxemburg and Finland) record a CAB 
‘close to balance or in surplus’, none of the 
other Member States is expected to show an 
annual improvement of its CAB of at least 0.5 
percentage points per year over the 2004-05 
period. Member States have agreed to an annual 
reduction of the CAB in the common economic 
policy strategy for the medium term set out in 
the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines for 
2003-2005. In this way Member States would 
help to prepare for the budgetary costs of the 
ageing populations while allowing the full 
working of automatic stabilisers in the next 
economic downturn. Between 2003 and 2005, 
the CAB is now forecast to deteriorate in half of 
the Member States, unless policies change.  
Debt developments. The programme updates 
project no change to the gross debt-to-GDP 
ratio in the euro area from 2003 (70.1%) to 
2004 (70.0%). In 2005 this ratio is expected to 
decline to 69.4% of GDP. Compared to the 
deterioration in 2003 by 1 percentage point of 
GDP, the improvement in the trend is expected 
to come mainly from higher nominal GDP 
growth already in 2004, supported by an 
improved primary balance in 2005. 
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Conversely, the Commission Spring 2004 
Economic Forecasts projects the gross debt-to-
GDP ratio to increase further to 70.9% in 2004 
and remain at that level in 2005. In particular, 
Greece, France, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Portugal are expected to perform worse than 
the path in their updated programmes, mainly 
reflecting expected deviations from their deficit 
targets and stock-flow effects.12  
Table 8 shows that seven Member States are 
expected to have debt levels above the 60% of 
GDP ceiling in 2005 (Belgium, Germany, 
Greece, France, Italy, Austria and Portugal). 
With the notable exception of Belgium and 
Austria, all countries with debt levels above 
60% of GDP are expected to record increases 
in their level between 2003 and 2005. Only 4 
countries are expected to meet their programme 
targets in 2004 and 2005.  
3. Fiscal policy and fiscal stance 
Looking at the development of the fiscal stance 
in the euro area, Graph 22 displays the changes 
in the cyclically adjusted primary balance13 in 
relation to cyclical conditions as measured by 
the output gap. In the graph, fiscal behaviour in 
accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact 
would be represented by movements along the 
horizontal axis. In other words, countries would 
achieve and maintain broadly balanced budgets 
over the economic cycle. Thus, changes in the 
output gap would not imply movements in the 
CAPB. However, as long as a Member State has 
not yet reached the medium-term target of the 
SGP, a restrictive fiscal stance – i.e. a positive 
change in CAPB, in the upper-half of the graph 
would be needed for a number of years. 
The graph shows that the fiscal stance was 
broadly neutral in 1999 before turning clearly 
expansionary between 2000 and 2002. Hence, 
the slippage in the overall euro-area budget 
                                                     
12  Stock-flow effects refer to all effects which account for 
differences between government net borrowing and the 
variation in the stock of gross public debt. This includes 
for instance changes in the value of debt denominated in 
foreign currency.  
13 The cyclically adjusted primary balance equals the 
cyclically adjusted balance excluding interest payments. 
deficit in the past few years, although mainly a 
reflection of the deterioration of economic 
activity, is also partly attributable to a couple of 
years of pro-cyclical fiscal loosening (see Box 2 
for a discussion of the fiscal slippage in the euro 
area). The fiscal stance turned neutral again in 
2003 while the output gap deteriorated sharply. 
Looking ahead, the euro area fiscal stance is – 
on the basis of unchanged policies - projected 
to continue to be neutral in 2004 and 2005. 
Lessons from the past show, however, that 
special efforts to improve the underlying budget 
positions should be made as economic 
conditions improve, in order to ensure 
sufficient room for the automatic stabilisers to 
operate in the next downturn. 
Graph 22: Euro-area fiscal stance and cyclical 
conditions, 1999-2005  
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Source: Commission services. 
4. Developments in Member States 
with high or excessive deficits 
Particular attention should be paid to the six 
Member States with high or excessive deficits. 
Germany, France, the Netherlands and Greece 
are currently in the so-called excessive deficit 
procedure of the EU fiscal framework, since 
they realised budget deficits above 3% of GDP 
in 2003. They are committed to reducing their 
deficits to below 3% of GDP by 2005. 
Moreover, on the basis of an unchanged policy 
assumption, Italy and Portugal risk recording a 
deficit above 3% of GDP in 2004, which would 
initiate the excessive deficit procedure.    
Recent information on the individual Member 
States’ growth developments and budgetary 
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execution suggests that in Germany budget 
deficits in both 2004 and 2005 will be higher 
than projected in the Commission’s Spring 
forecasts. An apparent tax-unfavourable 
composition of growth is likely to lead to a 
higher than expected budget deficit in 2004. A 
negative base effect from 2004 may also lead to 
an upward revision of the deficit in 2005. In 
France, the positive budgetary impact of better 
than expected economic developments has been 
countered by base effects and recent deficit-
increasing policy adjustments. However, at the 
Ecofin Council of 25 November 2003, both 
Germany and France committed themselves to 
reducing the deficit below 3% of GDP in 2005. 
Provided the governments implement the 
adjustments they have committed to, excessive 
deficits currently existing in Germany and 
France can be corrected in 2005.  
The 2004 budget deficit in the Netherlands is 
expected to be reduced as compared to previous 
estimates by a supplementary fiscal package  
adopted by the government by mid-April. It is 
expected to come down slightly from the high 
of 3.2% recorded in 2003 which resulted in the 
opening of the excessive deficit procedure. It is 
likely to fall below 3% next year if the 
government implements the additional 
measures intended for the 2005 Budget. 
In contrast, the correction of the excessive 
deficit in Greece and the avoidance of its 
occurrence in Italy and its re-occurrence in 
Portugal demand significant additional measures 
to be taken, including in the current year. In 
Greece, there is particular uncertainty in view of 
data revisions clouding the forecasts for 2004 
and 2005.   
In addition to avoiding excessive deficits, 
further budgetary consolidation efforts are also 
necessary in these six countries, as well as in 
Austria, in order to progress towards a 
budgetary position ‘close to balance or in 
surplus’.  
 
Box 2: Reviewing fiscal slippage in 1999-2003  
 
The overall stance of fiscal policy in the euro area (as measured by the change in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance) became expansionary after the introduction of the single currency in 1999. Nominal budget balances, 
however, generally improved, due to buoyant cyclical conditions. All Member States recorded remarkable 
improvements in nominal balances in 1999 and 2000. These developments mainly reflected the unexpected 
acceleration in economic growth and a strong rise in financial asset prices, which buoyed revenues. Furthermore in 
2000, additional and exceptional receipts arose from the auctions of UMTS licences. Although nominal balances 
improved, the cyclically adjusted (primary) balances deteriorated.   
 
 Changes in budget balances in the euro area, 
1999-2003 (% of GDP) (1) 
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 (1) BB: budget balance, CAB: cyclically adjusted budget balance,  
PCAB: cyclically adjusted primary balance. 
Source: Commission services. 
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The worsening in economic conditions starting in 2001 reversed the rosy picture of 1999 and 2000, and nominal 
budget deficits grew rapidly. After having achieved a surplus in 2000, the euro-area nominal budget deficit stands at 
2.7% of GDP in 2003, which is almost 1½ percentage points of GDP higher than in 1999. Although the economic 
slowdown was the main factor responsible for the deterioration in public finances in recent years, an important part 
of the deterioration stemmed from a worsening in the cyclically-adjusted budget balance (CAB). The CAB for the 
euro area in fact decreased from -1.7% in 1999 to -2.2% in 2003. While some half of the euro-area Member States 
completed the transition to budget positions of ‘close to balance or in surplus’, the larger countries in EMU have 
been amongst the group where underlying budgetary positions have failed to improve.  
The euro-area Member States which showed the largest deterioration in the CABs between 1999 and 2003 
(Germany, France and Greece) also exhibited the largest CAB and nominal deficits in 2003. The output gap 
deterioration in these countries was smaller than the average deterioration in the euro area. The countries with the 
largest swings in the output gap exhibited mixed fiscal developments. Austria and Portugal that experienced drops 
in the output gap by around 5%, strongly improved their CAB. Ireland and the Netherlands, which experienced 
similar drops in the output gap, let their CAB deteriorate somewhat.  
 
Changes in budget balances 1999-2003, euro-area Member States:  
 Nominal budget balances (1) Cyclically adjusted budget balances (2)  Output gap (3) 
 1999 2003 Change 1999 2003 Change 1999 2003 Change 
BE -0.5 0.3 0.7 -1.1 0.8 1.9 1.1 -0.8 -1.8 
DE -1.5 -3.9 -2.4 -1.5 -3.2 -1.7 0.0 -1.4 -1.5 
EL -1.8 -3.2 -1.4 -1.3 -3.8 -2.5 -1.0 1.5 2.6 
ES -1.2 0.3 1.5 -1.5 0.4 1.9 0.8 -0.1 -0.9 
FR -1.8 -4.1 -2.3 -2.2 -3.9 -1.7 1.1 -0.5 -1.6 
IE 2.4 0.2 -2.2 0.9 0.1 -0.8 4.6 0.3 -4.3 
IT -1.7 -2.4 -0.7 -1.9 -1.9 0.0 0.4 -1.2 -1.6 
LU 3.7 -0.1 -3.9 2.0 1.3 -0.7 3.1 -2.3 -5.4 
NL 0.7 -3.2 -3.8 -1.7 -2.0 -0.3 3.7 -1.7 -5.4 
AT -2.3 -1.3 1.0 -2.5 -1.0 1.4 0.7 -0.8 -1.6 
PT -2.8 -2.8 0.0 -3.5 -1.8 1.7 1.8 -2.8 -4.7 
FI 2.2 2.3 0.1 0.6 2.3 1.8 2.4 -0.1 -2.5 
EU-12 -1.3 -2.7 -1.4 -1.7 -2.2 -0.5 0.7 -1.1 -1.8 
(1) Data about Budget Balance includes UMTS receipts. 
(2) Data on CAB are netted of UMTS receipts. 
(3) On the basis of the PF method, except in the case of Germany, Spain and Austria, where the HP filter method has been used. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Focus 
III. Cyclical convergence in the euro area: recent developments 
and policy implications 
EMU is characterised by a high degree of cyclical convergence between participating Member States. Convergence is largely 
an EMU-specific factor rather than a reflection of the emergence of a world business cycle. It owes much to trade and 
financial integration and the convergence of macroeconomic policies within the euro area. As EMU is proving to be a major 
driving force of economic integration, it should also foster cyclical convergence still further in the years to come. Nevertheless, 
EMU is not exempt from forces of cyclical divergence, as shown by a temporary rise of output gap disparities in the late 
1990s. This phase of divergence can be explained by asymmetries related to the launch of the euro and differences in the 
transmission of common shocks. EMU contains a number of adjustment mechanisms that tend to counteract forces of 
cyclical divergence, including changes in external competitiveness and automatic fiscal stabilisers. These adjustment 
mechanisms have been at play in recent years. However, due to prevailing price and wage rigidities, adjustment based on 
competitiveness can be slow and involve costly over/undershooting. To limit cyclical divergence and enhance the effectiveness of 
the adjustment mechanisms, further progress with structural reforms and budgetary consolidation are both essential.  
 
1. Introduction 
The first years of EMU have seen persistent 
differences in economic growth between 
participating Member States. In 2003, the fastest 
growing country enjoyed a GDP growth rate 
which was 5.5 percentage points higher than 
that of the poorest performer. The size of the 
gap was by no means exceptional and was, in 
fact, slightly below the average registered since 
the inception of the single currency.  
Growth differences between two countries can 
be of a cyclical nature, reflecting the fact that 
countries are positioned at different stages of 
the business cycle or are subject to business 
cycles of different lengths or amplitudes. They 
can also reflect divergence in long-term growth 
patterns. Whereas the business cycle was the 
main source of growth differences between 
euro-area Member States in the 1970s and the 
1980s, differences in long-term growth gained 
in importance in the 1990s and now account for 
about two thirds of GDP growth differences.14  
The coverage of the present Focus Section is 
restricted to an analysis of cyclical 
convergence/divergence in the euro area. 
Despite a decrease in their relative importance 
in recent years, cyclical differences between 
                                                     
14  Based on a decomposition of the variance of growth 
across Member States into a cyclical and a trend 
component (HP filter).  
Member States remain a possible source of 
concern for the conduct of macroeconomic 
policies. Excessive cyclical divergence can 
impair the smooth functioning of an economic 
and monetary union and, in particular, 
complicate the conduct of monetary policy. In 
contrast, divergences in long-term growth are, 
to a large extent, a lesser concern for 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies.15 
Significant disparities in long-term growth 
patterns may actually be economically warranted 
if they result from a catching-up process 
characterised by faster growth in low income 
countries.  
2. Recent developments in cyclical 
convergence in the euro area  
Statistical theory offers a large variety of 
techniques to measure business cycles and their 
degree of convergence across countries.  
Graph 23 displays the unweighted average of 
the correlations of each Member State’s output 
gap with the euro-area’s output gap. Such a 
measure captures the extent to which national 
cycles are moving in tandem. The correlations 
are based on quarterly data and calculated for a 
                                                     
15  Nevertheless, to the extent that they give rise to 
differences in inflation with the so-called Balassa-
Samuelson effect, differences in long-term growth can 
lead to lasting differences in real interest rates and 
hinder the proper conduct of the single monetary policy.  
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rolling window of 8 years. Due to data 
limitations in quarterly accounts, Greece, 
Ireland and Luxembourg are excluded.  
Graph 23: Average output gap correlation of euro-area 
Member States’ (1) (8-year window - in %) 
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(1) Average of the correlation of individual Member State’s output 
gap with the overall euro-area output gap (excluding the Member 
State itself). Output gaps are calculated with an HP filter on 
quarterly GDP data. Due to data limitations, EL, IE, LU are 
excluded.  
Source: Commission services. 
The graph points to an overall high level of 
cyclical synchronisation between euro-area 
Member States since the late 1980s. 
Synchronisation decreased briefly after the mid-
1990s but renewed with a moderate upward 
trend after 2000 and now stands at its highest 
level in the past two decades. 
The picture of a high level of cyclical 
convergence in the euro area is also backed by 
an alternative measure of convergence, namely 
the dispersion of Member States’ output gaps 
around their mean. As shown in Graph 24, the 
dispersion of output gap points to a phase of 
cyclical divergence in the euro area in the late 
1990s followed by renewed convergence during 
the 2001-03 downturn. Nevertheless, these 
divergence and convergence phases largely 
reflect the overheating and the subsequent 
cooling off of the Irish and Luxembourg 
economies.16 Excluding these two countries, the 
two phases appear much more muted and the 
overall level of cyclical convergence has 
                                                     
16  In 2000, Ireland and Luxembourg were posting output 
gaps three times as large as the euro-area average. Given 
that Graph 2 is based on unweighted standard deviation, 
it tends to be dominated by these two outliers. 
remained high by historical standards since the 
launch of EMU.  
Graph 24: Dispersion of Member States’ output gaps, 
euro area (1) (in %) 
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(1) Output gaps are calculated with an HP filter on annual GDP 
data. Dispersion is measured by the standard deviation. 
(2) Excluding Ireland and Luxembourg.  
Source: Commission services. 
Overall, the early years of EMU have been 
marked by close synchronisation of fluctuations 
in Member States’ activity (Graph 23) even if 
some of them have experienced sharper cycles 
than others (Graph 24). This is suggestive of an 
environment where asymmetric shocks have 
been limited17 and where some countries have 
responded more strongly than others to 
common shocks.  
Looking further into the characteristics of 
cyclical convergence in EMU, the central role of 
investment stands out. Graph 25 on page 31 
displays the contributions of GDP components 
to the overall cyclical correlation between 
Member States displayed in Graph 23.18 Private 
consumption and investment emerge as the two 
major sources of cyclical convergence in the 
euro area. The contribution of investment is 
striking as it is much larger than the share of 
investment in GDP, indicating the central role 
played by capital formation in cyclical 
                                                     
17  Important asymmetric shocks in some countries should 
be reflected in a shift of the cycle of these countries 
relative to the euro-area cycle. There is no track of such 
shifts in the cyclical correlations presented in Graph 1.  
18  To facilitate reading, the graph omits the contribution of 
inventories which is rather low. 
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Box 3: Cyclical convergence within the euro area - global trend or an EMU-specific factor? 
 
The objective of the present box is to ascertain to what extent cyclical convergence in the euro area reflects EMU-
specific factors or more global trends. OECD countries have experienced a strong convergence in business cycles 
since the second half of the 1990s on the back of rising trade and financial integration as well as forceful common 
shocks. The high level of cyclical synchronisation observed in EMU could therefore be partly explained by the 
emergence of a world business cycle or by the temporary consequence of common shocks.  
 
The graph below compares cyclical convergence between euro-area Member States with cyclical convergence 
between the euro area and third countries. The left-hand panel of the graph plots the measure of intra-euro-area 
cyclical correlation presented in Graph 23 together with similar measures of cyclical correlation between, on the 
one hand, the euro area and, on the other hand, the USA or EU countries not participating in EMU (due to data 
limitation, these are restricted to Denmark, Sweden and the UK and do not include the 10 new Member States.).  
 
Cyclical correlation between the euro area and some other OECD countries 
(8-year window – in %) 
Output gap correlation with USA and EU-3 (1) Contribution of GDP components to the output gap 
correlation between the EU-3 (1) and the euro area 
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(1) Average correlation for DK, SE, UK. 
(2) Average output gap correlation of euro-area Member States’ as displayed in Graph 23. EU-9 is euro area except EL, IE, LU. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
The graph shows that, over the past two decades, cyclical synchronisation has tended to be much higher between 
euro-area Member States than between the euro area and other EU countries (EU-3) or the USA. However, a 
substantial increase in synchronisation between the euro area and third countries is clearly visible in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. The convergence is short-lived in the case of the USA but more lasting in the case of the EU-3.  
The temporary nature of the rise in cyclical correlation with the USA points a priori to common shocks as a key 
factor of cyclical convergence in OECD countries in recent years. The common shocks explanation seems to be 
difficult to reconcile with the apparent persistence of the convergence process in the case of EMU-3. However, 
before concluding that EU-wide factors (as opposed to EMU-specific factors) have been at play in the cyclical 
convergence process since the late 1990s, it is worth looking in more detail into the euro-area/EU-3 correlation. 
The right-hand panel of the above graph displays the contribution of GDP components to the overall cyclical 
correlation between the euro area and the EU-3. A striking feature of the graph is that the contributions are far less 
stable than in the case of intra-euro-area cyclical convergence (see Graph 25). Investment played a key role in 
convergence in the late 1990s but this was short-lived and followed by a rising contribution of net trade and 
government consumption. Hence, although cyclical convergence between the euro area and the EU-3 may, in part, 
reflect structural factors such as the deepening of the Internal Market and enhanced financial market integration, it 
also seems to be largely explained by a succession of temporary factors such as common shocks to investment and 
exchange rate fluctuations.  
 
Overall, the instability of the cyclical convergence process between the euro area and the USA or the EU-3 
contrasts with the more stable patterns registered in the case of intra-EMU convergence. This suggests that intra-
euro-area cyclical convergence is largely related to EMU-specific factors as opposed to global shocks or global 
economic integration.  
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convergence in the euro area. Net trade has 
traditionally made a negative contribution to 
cyclical correlation within the euro area but its 
contribution has increased since 1999.  
Graph 25: Contribution of GDP components to the 
output gap correlation between euro-area Member 
States (1) (8-year window – in %) 
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(1) The contributions of GDP components add up to the 
correlation displayed in Graph 23. EL, IE, LU are excluded due to 
data limitations. 
Source: Commission services. 
The high level of cyclical convergence reached in 
the euro area could be a consequence of 
economic and monetary integration or just a 
reflection of a global trend. The past few years 
have seen close synchronisation of business 
cycles in most advanced economies. This may be 
explained both by increasing global economic 
integration and by the occurrence of a number of 
forceful common shocks. The analysis presented 
in Box 3 suggests two conclusions.  
¾ First, the remarkable business cycle 
synchronisation between most advanced 
economies in the last few years is, at least in 
part, the consequence of common shocks 
and thereby, to some extent, a temporary 
phenomenon.  
¾ Second, beyond global shocks and global 
integration, there are forces of cyclical 
convergence that are specific to EMU. These 
forces are discussed in the next section. 
 
3. Forces of cyclical convergence and 
divergence in EMU.  
Main sources of convergence in EMU 
In an economic and monetary union, the degree 
of cyclical convergence between participating 
countries is not established once and for all but is 
shaped by the evolving macroeconomic and 
structural setup. Two forces have contributed to 
the greater synchronisation between euro-area 
Member States’ business cycles since the launch 
of EMU, namely, product and financial market 
integration and convergence in macroeconomic 
policies.  
Product and financial market integration. As discussed 
in more detail in Box 4, recent empirical studies 
have generally found a significant positive effect 
of trade and, to a lesser degree, financial 
integration on cyclical convergence between 
OECD countries.  
This conclusion suggests that EMU can have a 
positive impact on cyclical convergence between 
Member States through the trade and financial 
integration channels. There is now substantial 
empirical evidence that EMU has provided a 
strong stimulus to trade integration within the 
euro area and will likely continue to do so in the 
coming years. The advent of the common 
currency has also accelerated the integration of 
financial markets in the euro area. Although, 
globalisation has generally entailed closer 
integration of Western financial markets in the 
past decade, there has been a distinct and 
additional impact of the euro on financial 
integration within EMU countries. For instance, 
there is evidence of faster integration of stock 
markets in the euro area than elsewhere.19 In 
recent years, large flows of foreign direct 
investment between euro-area countries are 
further evidence of this trend. 
Graph 26 provides evidence of the effect of trade 
on cyclical convergence in the euro area. The 
graph plots the share of intra-euro-area trade 
together with the synchronisation of individual 
Member States’ business cycles with the euro-
area. Member States with a higher share of intra- 
                                                     
19  Brooks R. and M. Del Negro (2002), “International stock 
returns and market integration: a regional perspective”, 
IMF Working Paper, WP/02/202. 
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Box 4: How is trade and financial integration affecting business cycle synchronisation? 
 
Economic theory does not provide clear guidance regarding the impact of trade and financial integration on 
international cyclical synchronisation. Trade integration can affect both demand and supply conditions with 
possibly differing impacts on cyclical convergence. On the one hand, international trade facilitates the cross-border 
transmission of demand shocks. On the other hand, trade integration may foster inter-industry trade specialisation 
and therefore spark the probability of sectoral country-specific shocks. Similar arguments have been developed in 
the case of financial integration. On the demand side, financial integration encourages international portfolio 
diversification and thereby promotes cross-border comovements in private consumption. As in the case of trade, 
this positive effect of financial integration on demand synchronisation may be offset by higher risks of sectoral 
country-specific shocks, as more effective allocation of capital may foster production specialisation. Finally, 
financial integration also facilitates cross-border merger and acquisition activity and thereby cross-border corporate 
linkages. Given this theoretical indeterminacy, assessing the effect of integration on cyclical synchronisation is 
essentially an empirical issue.  
Trade integration. The recent empirical literature has generally found trade integration to have a positive effect on 
cyclical convergence. In their seminal work, Frankel and Rose (1998) report a strong positive relation between the 
bilateral trade intensities and bilateral correlations of business cycles of a panel of industrialised countries. Their 
result has generally been confirmed in subsequent research (see for instance Kose (2003b) for a review). There is 
also some evidence that cyclical synchronisation depends not only on the intensity of bilateral trade flows but also 
on the similarities in the structures of the economies considered. Imbs (2003) argues that countries with more 
similar economic structures, as measured by the sectoral specialisation of production, tend to post higher cyclical 
correlation. This works through two channels. First, similarities in production structures reduce the scope for 
country-specific sectoral shocks. Second, countries with similar production structures tend to trade more with each 
other. In other words, a sizeable part of the impact of trade integration on cyclical synchronisation could be linked 
to the existence of intra-industry trade.  
Financial integration. Empirical evidence on the link between financial integration and synchronisation is relatively 
sparse. Imbs (2003 and 2004) reports a significant positive relation. Kose et al (2003a and 2003b) find only limited 
support for an impact of financial integration on comovements in activity but they also report an increase in cross-
country correlations of investment for advanced economies. There is also some preliminary evidence that foreign 
direct investment may be an important factor of cyclical synchronisation. Jansen and Stockman (2003) find a strong 
positive link between bilateral FDI linkages and output comovement after the mid-1990s.  
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euro-area trade tend to post stronger cyclical 
synchronisation with the euro area than others. 
Nevertheless, the impact of EMU on cyclical 
convergence via product and financial market 
integration should not be overestimated. 
Integration is a relatively slow process and it is 
likely that the high level of cyclical convergence 
reached in the euro area has, at this stage, as 
much to do with the EU’s Internal Market 
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programme as with the, still largely forthcoming, 
integration effects of the euro.  
Graph 26: Trade and business cycle synchronisation, 
euro area (1) 
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(1) Trade is calculated as the sum of export and imports. Cyclical 
correlation is calculated with a BK filter applied to quarterly GDP 
data over 1996-2003.  
Source: Commission services. 
Convergence in macroeconomic policies. Another key 
source of cyclical synchronisation in EMU is the 
convergence of macroeconomic policies. It may 
be argued that independent national 
macroeconomic policies can be a source of 
cyclical divergence if they lead to different 
responses to common shocks. For instance, this 
could be the case if the respective importance 
attached to the output and inflation stabilisation 
objectives of independent monetary policies vary 
across countries.  
Graph 27: Convergence in interest rates, euro area  
(standard deviation of Member States short-term real 
interest rates in %) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Reflecting increased coordination of 
macroeconomic policies, first with the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (EMR) and later with the EMU 
process, the past two decades have witnessed a 
progressive convergence of macroeconomic 
policies. The trend is particularly clear in the case 
of monetary policy. As shown in Graph 27, the 
single monetary policy has brought about a fair 
degree of convergence in real interest rates. Due 
to a moderate pick-up in inflation differences 
between Member States, a moderate upward drift 
in the dispersion of real interest rates is 
noticeable since the launch of EMU but the 
overall level of dispersion has remained low by 
historical standards in the past years.  
It is difficult to determine empirically to what 
extent convergence in macroeconomic policies is 
a source or a mere reflection of increased cyclical 
synchronisation. Artis and Zhang20 compare the 
pre-ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism) period 
with the ERM period and show that the latter has 
been associated with a shift of the business cycle 
affiliations of participating countries from the US 
cycle to the German cycle. The finding is 
suggestive of a possible strong impact of 
monetary policy on cyclical convergence.21  
Another argument is the leading role played by 
investment in cyclical correlation in the euro area 
(see Section 1). The fact that investment is 
generally found to be the component of GDP 
that is the most sensitive to short-term interest 
rates and monetary policy in the euro area further 
supports the idea of a causal link between 
monetary and cyclical convergence.  
In the case of budgetary policies, there is some 
evidence that the coordination framework of 
EMU has allowed some of the mistakes of the 
past to be avoided. In particular, European 
countries have in the past shown a tendency to 
run pro-cyclical budgetary policies that have 
exacerbated cyclical differences. Although failure 
to pursue budgetary consolidation in the good 
                                                     
20  Artis, M.J. and W. Zhang (1999), ‘Further evidence on 
international business cycles and the ERM: is there a 
European business cycle?’, Oxford Economic Papers, 1999, 
January 51, pp; 120-32. 
21  However, this conclusion has not remained unchallenged. 
For a criticism, see Inklaar, R. and de J. de Haan (2001), 
‘Is there really a European business cycle? A comment’, 
Oxford Economic Papers, 53, pp. 215-20. 
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times of the late 1990s in some Member States 
has limited budgetary room for manoeuvre, these 
pro-cyclical tendencies have been largely 
contained in the latest downturn.  
Main sources of divergence in EMU 
Notwithstanding the overall high level of cyclical 
convergence registered in the euro area so far, 
EMU has not been exempt from forces of 
cyclical divergence. First, the inception of EMU 
may in itself have constituted an asymmetric 
shock in some Member States. Second, with a 
single monetary policy, differences in countries’ 
inflation rates translate into differences in real 
interest rates that may exacerbate cyclical 
divergences. Third, there may be asymmetries 
between countries in the transmission of 
common shocks. 
EMU inception as an asymmetric shock. There is 
evidence that the inception of EMU has in itself 
been an asymmetric shock in some Member 
States, either as a consequence of the interest rate 
convergence process which preceded the launch 
of the euro or due to a misalignment of the initial 
exchange rate parities.  
Nominal convergence in the run-up to EMU has 
translated into a rapid fall of real interest rates 
during the second half of the 1990s in countries 
such as Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Finland. This is likely to have contributed to 
wider cyclical differences by spurring domestic 
demand. In this respect, it is worth noting that all 
the above countries except Italy experienced 
comparatively stronger developments in domestic 
demand in the late 1990s than the rest of the 
euro-area.  
Given the methodological difficulties, estimates 
of equilibrium exchange rates and of possible 
exchange rate misalignments at the time of the 
launch of the euro should be considered with 
prudence. It is nevertheless worth noting that, 
according to estimates made by Hansen and 
Roeger,22 in the late 1990s fast growing countries 
such as the Netherlands, Finland and Ireland 
                                                     
22  Hansen, J. and W. Roeger (2000), ‘Estimations of real 
equilibrium exchange rates’, European Commission, DG 
ECFIN Economic Paper, No. 144.  
were all enjoying undervalued currencies relative 
to their equilibrium values whereas slow-growing 
Germany was posting an overvalued currency.  
Differences in inflation and real interest rates. As a 
single currency brings convergence in nominal 
interest rates, inflation differences translate into 
differences in real interest rates. This effect may 
be self-reinforcing and can magnify cyclical 
divergence. For instance, an overheating country 
will tend to post above euro-area average 
inflation. The resulting low real interest rate will 
fuel domestic demand and raise further price 
pressures and cyclical divergence.  
Despite a broad convergence trend during much 
of the 1990s, disparities in real interest rates 
remain significant in the euro area. In 2003, the 
difference between the highest and the lowest 
Member State real interest rates was close to 
2.5%. As illustrated in Graph 28, real interest 
rates at the peak of the cycle in 2000 were 
significantly higher in those Member States that 
had built-up a large positive output gap. Due to 
inflation inertia, these differences have persisted 
throughout the ensuing downturn. 
Graph 28: Country differences in short-term real interest 
rate and output gaps,(1) euro area  
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(1) Real interest rates are calculated with the consumption deflator. 
Output gaps are based on an HP filter. 
Source: Commission services. 
Asymmetric transmission of common shocks.  Common 
shocks can have asymmetric impacts on countries 
characterised by different economic structures. 
Asymmetric transmission can originate in 
differences in the degree of exposure to shocks.  
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Box 5: Decomposing output gap dispersion in the euro area  
 
The table below displays the contributions of consumption, investment and trade to the total variance of output 
gaps across Member States. The contributions are derived from a standard covariance formula. The upper half of 
the table displays the contributions in 2004 and, as a matter of comparison, the average contributions for the 10 
years preceding EMU. The lower half of the table displays the changes in contributions during the period of cyclical 
divergence of the late 1990s (1997-2000) and the changes in contributions during the period of cyclical convergence 
after 2000. Two results stand out: 
 
¾ Comparing 2004 and the 10 years preceding EMU, the contribution of investment to output gap disparities 
appears to be currently quite low by historical standards. This confirms the important role played by 
investment in cyclical convergence in the euro area.  
 
¾ Looking at the changes in contributions in the lower half of the table, net trade emerges at the major source 
of cyclical divergence in the late 1990s and the major force of convergence in the first years of the present 
decade. The changes in the contribution of net trade were only partly offset by opposite fluctuations in the 
contribution of private consumption. 
 
Contribution of GDP components to output gap differences between Member States, euro area (1) - in % 
 
 Total (2) Consumption Investment Net trade Other (3) 
2004 0.6 1.2 0.7 0.1 -1.4 
Average 1989-98 3.4 1.7 2.7 -1.3 0.3 
Change 2000-03 -3.2 9.3 0.3 -10.3 -2.5 
Change 1997-00 3.4 -10.0 0.2 12.5 0.7 
(1) Output gap differences are measured by the variance of Member States’ output gaps.  
(2) Variance of Member States’ output gaps. Sum of the columns on consumption, investment, net trade and other. 
(3) Government consumption and inventories. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Overall, external trade emerges as the major source of changes in output gap differences between Member States 
since the launch of the euro, although the approach used here does not allow the respective roles of fluctuations in 
world trade and in the euro exchange rate in this process to be disentangled. Conversely, the results suggest that 
sources of cyclical divergence linked to domestic demand have not been prevalent in the past few years.  
For instance, wealth effects consecutive to a fall 
in equity prices may vary across countries 
depending on the size of equity ownership. 
Asymmetries may also reflect differences in the 
strength of the economy’s stabilisation forces. 
For instance, a more flexible labour market will 
help to absorb a shock more rapidly. 
Differences in the adjustment to shocks will be 
discussed further in the next section.  
Since the late 1990s, EMU Member States have 
been subject to a number of common shocks, 
including swings in key prices (financial asset 
prices, oil prices and the external value of the 
euro), changes in the monetary stance, several 
confidence shocks and a pronounced world 
trade cycle. Different exposures to these shocks 
may have contributed to temporary cyclical 
divergence in the euro area. In this respect, it is 
worth noting that differences in output gaps 
widened in the late 1990s when most of the 
common shocks were affecting the economy 
positively and narrowed again in the early 2000s 
when the shocks were reversed.  
Disentangling the respective contributions to 
cyclical divergence of the various possible 
transmission asymmetries is difficult. However, 
differences in the degree of exposure to extra-
euro-area trade seem to have played a central 
role. This can be seen in Graph 29 on the next 
page which exhibits a positive relation between 
Member States’ exposure to extra-euro-area 
trade and the size of the output gap at the peak 
of the cycle. In other words, the very strong 
expansion of world trade in the late 1990s was 
an important cause of cyclical divergence within 
the euro-area during that period. The 
subsequent recession in world trade then had 
the opposite effect. Graph 30 shows that the 
Member States with a high exposure to extra-
euro-area trade are also those which incurred 
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the largest losses in output gap during the two 
years of recession in world trade in 2001 and 
2002.23  
Graph 29: Country differences in output gap and 
extra-euro-area trade exposure at the peak of the cycle  
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(1) Exports of goods.  
Source: Commission services. 
Graph 30: Strength of cyclical slowdown and extra-
euro-area trade exposure (1)  
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(1) IE excluded.  
(2) Exports of goods.  
Source: Commission services. 
A similar point is made in Box 5 which presents 
a breakdown by GDP components of the 
dispersion of output gaps between euro-area 
Member States. The analysis highlights trade as 
the major source of changes in output gap 
dispersion since the inception of EMU. Trade 
                                                     
23  The correlation between the two variables is high only if 
Ireland is excluded. In that country, the impact of the 
slowdown in world trade was partly delayed by special 
factors related to the multinational sector. As a result, 
the output gap deteriorated mainly in 2003 and not in 
2001-02 as in other countries.  
was the major cause of increased output gap 
dispersion in the late 1990s and of reduced 
output gap dispersion over 2001-03.  
Overall, there is therefore substantial evidence 
that the strong expansion of world trade in the 
late 1990s and the ensuing world trade recession 
in 2001-02 were, successively, a significant 
source of cyclical divergence and convergence 
within the euro area. The effect of these 
fluctuations in world trade was exacerbated by 
largely synchronised swings in the external value 
of the euro. For instance, the phase of 
depreciation of the euro in 1999-00 accentuated 
the growth stimulus of exports in the Member 
States more open to extra-euro-area trade.24 
However, the respective effects of trade and 
exchange rates are difficult to disentangle.  
Although trade seems to have played a critical 
role in explaining changes in cyclical 
convergence since the launch of EMU, other 
possible transmission asymmetries should also 
be noted: 
¾ Empirical research has generally highlighted 
the existence of differences between 
Member States regarding the importance of 
wealth effects without, however, reaching 
clear agreement as to the magnitude of 
these differences. Given large fluctuations 
in equity prices and sustained price increases 
in the housing sector; wealth effects may 
have contributed to cyclical divergence in 
the euro area in the past few years.  
¾ The transmission of monetary policy 
impulses may differ from one country to 
the other. These differences may be related 
to the degree of exposure to external trade 
and the importance of the exchange rate 
channel of monetary policy. They may also 
be related to the importance of bank 
                                                     
24  The depreciation also raised inflation pressures in these 
countries via higher imported inflation. However, 
differences in the impact of the exchange rate on 
inflation do not only depend on trade openness but also 
on differences in the pass-through. Empirical evidence 
suggests that the latter can be significant. See for 
instance, Campa, J.M. and J.M. Gonzáles-Mingues 
(2002), ‘Differences in exchange rate pass-through in the 
euro area”, Banco de España, Documento de Trabajo 
No. 0219, July. 
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financing relative to market financing or to 
the characteristics of the housing and 
mortgage markets.  
¾ There are indications of asymmetries in the 
response of national economies to large 
increases in oil prices. These asymmetries 
are related to differences in oil dependency 
but also to differences in policy reaction and 
in the capacity of the labour market to 
absorb such shocks (see section on the 
impact of oil prices in this report).  
Overall, although these three sources of 
asymmetries cannot be ruled out as potentially 
significant forces of cyclical divergence in the 
future, their contribution to divergence in the 
first years of EMU was probably significantly 
more modest than that of external trade. The 
three sources of asymmetries work largely – 
although not exclusively – via domestic 
demand. The decomposition of output gap 
dispersion in Box 5 suggests that the 
contribution of domestic demand to the 
temporary increase in cyclical divergence in the 
late 1990s was limited.  
4. The adjustment mechanisms in 
EMU 
An economic and monetary union is also 
characterised by built-in adjustment 
mechanisms that tend to counteract forces of 
cyclical divergence. In the euro area, 
competitiveness effects and automatic fiscal 
stabilisers are the two most important 
mechanisms in this respect.  
Competitiveness effects. Member States where 
cyclical growth is stronger than the euro-area 
average also tend to experience stronger 
domestic price pressures. The associated losses 
in competitiveness will then progressively bring 
the deviating cycle back in line with the overall 
euro-area cycle.  
As shown in Graph 31, this competitiveness 
adjustment has, to some extent, been at play in 
the euro area in the latest cycle. Since the launch 
of the euro, competitiveness relative to the 
other Member States has deteriorated 
significantly in the Netherlands and improved 
somewhat in Germany. However, large positive 
output gaps in the late 1990s have not led to a 
deterioration of relative competitiveness in 
Ireland and Finland and comparatively weak 
cyclical developments in Italy have been 
associated with real appreciation.  
Graph 31: Competitiveness effects as an adjustment to 
cyclical divergence, euro area  
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(1) As measured by the real effective exchange rate (based on 
manufacturing unit labour cost) relative to other euro-area 
Member States.  
Source: Commission services. 
The effectiveness of the competitiveness 
mechanism in correcting cyclical divergence 
may be hampered by two factors.  
First, as already noted, inflation differentials 
translate into differences in real interest rates. 
Hence, in a country experiencing stronger 
cyclical growth and faster inflation, domestic 
demand will be boosted by comparatively lower 
interest rates. In its early stages, the negative 
competitiveness effect will tend to be offset by 
this positive real interest rate effect. Although 
the competitiveness will ultimately prevail,25 the 
speed of the correction will depend on the 
sensitivity of domestic demand to interest rates. 
Second, the effectiveness of the competitiveness 
mechanism will depend on the flexibility of the 
response of wages and prices to cyclical 
developments. There is, in general, a significant 
degree of nominal wage rigidity in the euro 
                                                     
25  A constant inflation differential with the euro-area 
average will entail a constant interest rate differential but 
a continuous deterioration of competitiveness. 
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area.26 Simulations carried out with a small 
stylised macroeconomic model suggest that the 
adjustment to asymmetric shocks via the 
competitiveness mechanism can be slow and 
lead to periods of undershooting and 
overshooting.27 In this regard, it is interesting to 
note that two of the four countries which were 
posting the largest positive output gaps at the 
peak of the cycle in 2000 now report the largest 
negative output gaps in the euro area.  
Finally, it is worth stressing that the 
effectiveness of the competitiveness adjustment 
mechanism will vary significantly from one 
country to another. Labour market effectiveness 
and openness to trade are two critical 
parameters in this respect.  
There is still considerable variation across euro-
area countries in terms of labour market 
efficiency, both in employment regulations and 
in wage flexibility. These labour market 
differences could be an important source of 
asymmetries in the adjustment mechanism.  
The impact of change in competitiveness on 
overall activity will depend on the sensitivity of 
exports to prices and the importance of trade in 
the economy. In this regard, differences in trade 
openness constitute an important source of 
asymmetries in the adjustment mechanisms in 
the euro area. Small Member States tend to be 
much more open to trade than larger ones. This 
is probably one of the factors explaining why 
the correction to the weak cyclical position of 
Germany is taking much more time than the 
correction to the overheating in the 
Netherlands.  
Automatic fiscal stabilisers. Automatic stabilisers 
make for smoother cyclical fluctuations and can 
therefore help to reduce cyclical divergence in 
the euro area. Due to the size of the 
                                                     
26  According to Commission estimates, only about 65% of 
the wage adjustment to an inflationary shock takes place 
within the first year. See European Commission (2003), 
‘The EU economy 2003 review’, Chapter 4, European 
Economy, No. 6/2003.  
27  Deroose, S., Langedijk, S. and W. Roeger (2004), 
‘Reviewing adjustment dynamics in EMU: from 
overheating to overcooling’, European Commission, 
DG ECFIN Economic Paper, No. 198.  
government sector, the progressiveness of tax 
systems and the rather generous unemployment 
benefit systems, fiscal stabilisers are relatively 
large in the euro area. However, their 
effectiveness in smoothing the cycle depends on 
the source of the cyclical fluctuations. It also 
varies significantly across countries. Simulations 
carried out with DG ECFIN’s QUEST model 
show that automatic stabilisers are more 
effective in the case of a shock to consumption 
than in the case of a shock to investment or 
exports. They also point to large differences in 
the smoothing effect of stabilisers across 
countries, depending on factors such as trade 
openness and the structure of the tax system 
(Graph 32).28 Finally, it should be noted that, 
for some Member States, insufficient fiscal 
consolidation in the good times of the late 
1990s has hindered the free play of automatic 
stabilisers during the downturn. 
Graph 32: Smoothening capacity of fiscal stabilisers 
for a variety of demand shocks, euro area (1) 
(in % of GDP)  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
BE DE EL ES FR IE IT NL AT PT FI  
(1) For each country, the graph displays a range of estimates of 
the smoothing capacity for various demand shocks. In most cases, 
the largest smoothing effect is found for consumption shocks and 
the lowest one for trade shocks.  
Source: Brunila A., Buti M. and J. in’t Veld (2002). 
 
                                                     
28  Brunila A., Buti M. and J. in’t Veld (2002), ‘Fiscal policy 
in Europe: how effective are automatic stabilisers?’, 
European Commission, DG ECFIN Economic Paper, No. 
177. 
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5. Policy implications  
Although EMU can be seen as an overall source 
of cyclical convergence between Member States, 
it is not exempt from forces of divergence. 
Hence, some cyclical divergence took place in 
the early years of EMU as a result of differences 
in the transmission of common shocks and 
asymmetries related to the launch of the euro. 
In an economic and monetary union, cyclical 
divergence between participating countries is to 
some extent offset by changes in competitive 
position and the play of automatic stabilisers. 
Nevertheless, due to prevailing price and wage 
rigidities, adjustment can be slow and involve 
some costly over/under shooting.  
In theory, discretionary fiscal policy could be 
used to deal with excessive cyclical deviation in 
one country, provided that the deviation 
originates in demand rather than supply forces. 
In practice, there is now large recognition that 
fiscal fine-tuning is faced with a variety of 
difficulties which can seriously blunt its 
effectiveness.29 As already noted, fiscal policy 
has tended to be frequently pro-cyclical in euro-
area countries in the past. This pro-cyclical bias 
reflects, in part, the existence of significant time 
lags in implementation and difficulties in 
identifying cyclical positions with precision. The 
latter are likely to be magnified when the issue is 
less to identify the absolute cyclical position of a 
given country than its deviation relative to the 
euro-area average. Furthermore, model  
                                                     
29  See European Commission (2002), ‘Public finances in 
EMU – 2002’, European Economy, No. 3 2002. 
simulations suggest that the impact of 
discretionary policy on output gaps is relatively 
limited, especially in the case of small open 
economies, which are also the ones most in 
need of individual stabilisation tools.  
Overall, the analysis suggests that cyclical 
disparities within EMU are, in general, better 
dealt with by a combination of market-based 
adjustment and the free play of automatic 
stabilisers rather than by discretionary fiscal 
policy. There are three key policy implications. 
¾ It is necessary to pursue fiscal consolidation 
in those countries which do not have 
sufficient budgetary margins to let 
automatic stabilisers play their full part.  
¾ Further structural reforms of product and 
labour markets will improve price and wage 
flexibility, thereby transferring the burden 
of the adjustment to cyclical divergence 
from macroeconomic policy to market 
forces and from quantities (employment, 
activity, etc.) to prices. Increased flexibility 
reduces the risks of periods of 
over/undershooting in the adjustment 
process and, more generally, the magnitude 
of cyclical fluctuations.  
¾ Progress with the Internal Market will raise 
trade and financial linkages between 
Member States, thereby fostering further 
cyclical convergence and reducing the need 
for adjustment.  
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V. Key indicators for the euro area 
1 Output 2001 2002 2003* Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -10 -12 -6 -7 -7 -5 -5 -4
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch 0.2 -0.9 -0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 
  2001 2002 2003* 03Q1 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Qtr. % ch 0.0 -0.1 0.4 0.4 0.6
2 Private consumption 2001 2002 2003* Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -6 -11 -15 -14 -14 -14 -16 -14
 Retail sales 2.2  mom % ch 1.3 1.3 1.8 -1.1 -0.2 1.3 
  2001 2002 2003* 03Q1 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 
 Private consumption 2.3 Qtr. % ch 1.8 0.6 1.7 0.5 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6
3 Investment 2001 2002 2003* 03Q1 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 83.5 81.2  81.0 80.7 80.3 80.9 80.5 80.6 
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 Qtr. % ch -0.3 -1.9 2.0 -0.8 -0.3 0.0 0.6 -0.1  
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.3  
4 Labour market 2001 2002 2003* Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04
 Unemployment 4.1 % 8.0 8.2 8.3 8.9 8.9 9.0 9.0   
   2001 2002 2003* 03Q1 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 
 Employment 4.2 Ann. % ch 1.4 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1   
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 7.8 3.8  3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 
 Wages 4.4 Ann. % ch 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.5 2.5    
5 International transactions  2001 2002 2003* Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -14 -22  -19 -21 -19 -13 -15 -11 
 World trade 5.2 Bn. EUR 6454 6309        
 Exports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 767.4 776.9 823.4 90.4 91.5 91.9 93.6   
 Imports of goods 5.4 Bn. EUR 802.2 781.6 828.1 82.1 83.5 82.1 86.0   
 Trade balance 5.5 Bn. EUR -34.8 -4.7 -4.7 8.3 8.0 9.8 7.5   
   2001 2002 2003* 03Q1 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 
 Exports of goods and services 5.6 Qtr. % ch 4.3 0.7 6.1 -1.5 -0.9 2.3 0.1 1.7  
 Imports of goods and services 5.7 Qtr. % ch 2.1 -1.6 6.2 -0.6 -0.5 1.3 1.1 0.8  
   2001 2002 2003* Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04
 Current account balance 5.8 Bn. EUR -12.3 9.6 11.0 2.5 5.4 5.1 9.0   
 Direct investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR -104.6 -90.4  -11.0 7.8 -22.6 -3.3   
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.10 Bn. EUR 36.5 38.0  -11.5 4.4 -1.3 -3.0   
6 Prices  2001 2002 2003* Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04
 HICP 6.1 Ann. % ch 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.5 2.4 
 Core HICP 6.2 Ann. % ch 1.9 2.5 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1  
 Producer prices 6.3 Ann. % ch 2.2 1.7  0.3 0.0 0.4 1.4   
 Import prices 6.4 Ann. % ch 102.2 102.4        
7 Monetary and financial indicators  2001 2002 2003* Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 4.3 3.3  2.1 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 5.0 4.8  4.2 4.1 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.3 
 ECB repo rate 7.3  % p.a. 3.25 2.75  2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
 Stock markets 7.4  Index 4047 3053  2839 2875 2835 2861 2729 2791 
 M3 7.5 Ann. % ch 5.3 5.6  6.6 6.4 6.2 5.5 4.7  
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 Ann. % ch 7.9 7.7  5.5 5.5 5.4 5.5 5.6  
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 0.90 0.95 1.13 1.26 1.26 1.23 1.20 1.20 1.21 
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 91.5 95.1 106.2 110.7 110.4 108.6 107.0 108.5  
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Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output   
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production  Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product  Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption   
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator  
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment   
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market   
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Number of employees, partially estimated, seasonally adjusted ECB/ 
Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Not fully harmonised concept, but representative for each Member State 
(mostly hourly earnings) 
ECFIN 
5 International transactions  
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 World trade Bn; EUR, current prices, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.3 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, fob Eurostat 
5.4 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, cif Eurostat 
5.5 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, fob-cif Eurostat 
5.6 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.8 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions; before 1997 partly estimated ECB 
5.9 Direct investment   (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions ECB 
5.10 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions ECB 
6 Prices   
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
6.4 Import prices Import unit value index for goods  Eurostat 
7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Datastream
7.2 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Datastream
7.3 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Datastream
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Datastream
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7.5 M3  Seasonally adjusted moving average moving average (3 last months)  ECB 
7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
MFI loans to euro area residents excluding MFIs and general government, 
monthly values: month end values, annual values: annual averages 
ECB 
7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR  Period averages ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
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